How State Supreme Courts Can Prevent Prolonged Election Contests

It took six months to declare a winner in the 2024 North Carolina Supreme Court race between incumbent Allison Riggs, a Democrat, and challenger Jefferson Griffin, a Republican.¹ The initial results had Riggs beating Griffin by less than 750 votes out of 5.5 million cast—a margin of less than 0.02%.² State election officials confirmed these results, first through a full, statewide recount and then through a partial recount, both of which were completed by mid-December—just over a month after the election.³ But Griffin then formally challenged the results through a state law process called an "election protest."⁴ The protest was promptly dismissed by election officials, but Griffin appealed, which blocked election officials from certifying Riggs as the winner and led to several months of litigation in state and federal courts.⁵ The dispute ended in May 2025 only when a federal judge ordered state officials to certify the election, prompting Griffin to concede.⁶

Election protests, or "election contests" as they are more often called, play an important role in the democratic process.⁷ Typically filed in state court, election contests provide a formal mechanism for disputing election results.⁸ They allow aggrieved candidates and, in some states, voters to present evidence of election irregularities or illegal behavior that could warrant overturning the outcome or even ordering a new election. And because they follow other post-election procedures, like the initial count and any recounts, contests serve as a final safeguard of electoral integrity and help legitimize election results.

While election contests serve an important role, they do not always conclude quickly, as North Carolina’s experience demonstrates. Prolonged election contests—and particularly those that extend beyond the start of the term of office at issue—can have real costs. They risk drawing out elections and undermining public confidence in the results.⁹ They can also leave citizens without representation.¹⁰ In North Carolina, Riggs was able to continue serving on the supreme court while the contest played out due to a state "holdover" law allowing incumbents to remain in office until a winner is declared and sworn in.¹¹ But lengthy contests can block non-incumbents who win at the ballot box from taking office. That is what happened to Minnesota’s Al Franken, who won his 2008 U.S. Senate race by a few hundred votes. A contest brought by his opponent prevented Franken from being sworn in until July 2009—eight months after the election—leaving Minnesota with only one senator during that time.¹²

Moreover, the potential to prevent winning candidates from taking office creates a perverse incentive for losing candidates to prolong their election contests, even if their contests have little merit. Some observers have raised this particular concern in the context of the upcoming 2026 Congressional midterm elections.¹³ This is because nothing in federal law requires states to certify the results of their congressional elections by a specific date,¹⁴ yet House rules provide that only candidates whose certificates of elections are on file with the House Clerk when the new Congress convenes on January 3, 2027 are eligible to vote for Speaker.¹⁵ The concern is that unresolved contests as of that date could block the winning candidates from participating in the Speaker vote, potentially preventing the party that wins the most seats in the election from actually controlling the chamber.

These examples highlight a critical vulnerability: while state election laws commonly impose deadlines for commencing election contests, few impose deadlines for resolving them or establish procedures to expedite appeals. This creates the potential for exactly the kind of prolonged uncertainty experienced in North Carolina and Minnesota, or the strategic delays that could affect Congressional races.

This Explainer examines these gaps and considers how state courts—which are central players in election contests—can help to ensure that elections are timely resolved. Part I surveys state statutory frameworks for election contests (or equivalent) with an emphasis on questions of timing. Part II then examines state supreme courts’ constitutionally grounded supervisory and rulemaking powers, which authorize the courts to manage and establish procedures for their states’ judiciaries—and explains steps that some high courts have already taken to ensure that election litigation is resolved expeditiously. And Part III explores some of the specific considerations and options that warrant attention as courts consider whether and how to use their powers to set parameters for election contests—and perhaps streamline processes for other election-related cases as well.

I. Statutory Timelines for Resolving Election Contests

Nearly every state has created, by statute, an election contest process for formally challenging election results; a few instead utilize quo warranto actions.¹⁶ But the laws governing these contests vary from state to state and even within a single state, depending on the office at issue and whether it is a primary or general election.¹⁷ This Part examines how state laws differ regarding when contests must be filed, how quickly they must be decided, and what appeals are available. This piece excludes state laws concerning presidential election contests because the federal Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022 (ECRA) requires states to resolve such contests by a uniform deadline before the Electoral College meets.¹⁸ For all other races, however, a clear pattern emerges: most states require prompt filing of contests, but far fewer require prompt resolution or expedite the appellate process.

A. Commencing Contests

The vast majority of states with election contests for non-presidential races impose relatively prompt deadlines for commencing them.¹⁹ Filing deadlines typically range from a few days to about 40 days after election results are certified, though some states measure the deadline from the date of the election rather than from certification of the results.²⁰ Such deadlines ensure that challenges are brought quickly, preventing candidates from sitting on potential claims and encouraging prompt resolution of electoral disputes.²¹ But filing deadlines are only part of the equation. Without corresponding deadlines for resolution, there is a risk that even promptly filed contests can stretch on for months.

B. Resolving Contests

While nearly every state requires prompt filing of election contests, few have laws requiring prompt resolution once litigation begins. In many states contests simply proceed at the discretion of the tribunal. North Carolina exemplifies the risks of this approach: with no statutory deadline for resolution, the 2024 Supreme Court contest lasted six months, ending only when a federal court ordered certification.

Other states provide some guidance but stop short of hard deadlines for resolving contests. This sometimes comes in the form of aspirational language directing tribunals to prioritize contests over other matters or to resolve them "as soon as possible" (or equivalent), leaving considerable discretion in practice.²² Other times, laws establish procedural milestones, such as requiring hearings within specified timeframes or limiting adjournments, without mandating when final resolution must occur.²³ Although these approaches attempt to encourage prompt resolution of election contests, they offer no guarantees.

Meanwhile, only a handful of states’ laws impose hard deadlines for resolving contests. Louisiana, for instance, requires trial courts to begin the contest within four days of the suit’s filing and to issue judgment within 24 hours of the trial’s conclusion.²⁴ Arizona, California, and Connecticut provide similar but slightly longer timelines.²⁵ And Minnesota requires state legislative contests to conclude by the start of the legislature’s next session following the election.²⁶ Thus, while clear statutory deadlines for resolving contests are possible, only a small minority of states have them.

C. Appellate Review

Another major factor that influences how long election contests last is the availability and procedures for appellate review. Most states provide some form of appellate review, but most lack statutory requirements to expedite appeals, creating risk of prolonged litigation.

As an initial matter, not every state provides for appellate review of election contest decisions. In some states, contests over certain races are filed directly with tribunals that serve as final decision-makers, foreclosing any appeal. Such tribunals are typically either the state supreme court or state legislature, with the latter often deciding contests for state legislative seats and sometimes contests for statewide executive offices.²⁷ Most states, however, have a lower court or a non-judicial body serve as the initial tribunal for contests and provide appellate review for at least some combination of local, state, and federal races.²⁸

Among states that provide appellate review, the appellate path varies—and this variation affects timing. A small number of states—eight—do not have intermediate appellate courts, simplifying the appellate path.²⁹ But among states with intermediate appellate courts, some require appeals to proceed through each level—first to an intermediate appellate court, then to the state supreme court³⁰—while others allow the losing party to bypass the intermediate level and appeal directly to the supreme court.³¹ Contests subject to multiple layers of review can take much longer than those with a single appeal to the highest court.

Just as important as appellate structure is whether states have established expedited procedures for appeals. While several states have enacted such procedures, they remain the exception rather than the rule.³² Georgia, for instance, requires that an appeal of a trial court’s ruling in an election contest be filed within 10 days of the ruling, rather than the typical 30 days for other civil cases.³³ Louisiana compresses timelines further, requiring an appeal of a trial court’s decision to the intermediate court of appeals within 24 hours and requiring an appeal of an appellate court’s decision to the supreme court within 48 hours.³⁴ Other states direct appellate courts to prioritize the appeal without imposing hard deadlines.³⁵

But most states lack such specialized procedures. In these jurisdictions, appeals of contests proceed according to ordinary appellate timelines, which can extend for months. When combined with multiple appellate layers, the lack of expedited procedures creates a substantial risk of prolonged litigation—particularly in close races where losing candidates have an incentive to pursue all available appeals.

II. The Supervisory and Rulemaking Powers of State Supreme Courts

Legislative action may be the most obvious way to address the gaps in states’ election contest procedures identified in Part I. But it is not the only way, and it may not even be the best way. Lawmakers might reasonably be reluctant to dictate timelines to independent adjudicators, and adjudicators themselves may have the best sense of what deadlines are realistic. Using their supervisory and rulemaking powers, state supreme courts can play an important role in averting prolonged election contests. This Part discusses these powers and examines how some supreme courts have already used them to encourage the timely resolution of election litigation.

A. Supervisory Power

The first of these constitutional tools is the supervisory power—state supreme courts’ authority to oversee the administration of justice in their states’ courts.³⁶ Every state high court claims this authority, typically through explicit constitutional provisions or by inference from their role as head of the judicial branch.³⁷ And unlike traditional adjudicative or appellate powers, the supervisory power operates independently of specific cases or controversies, enabling supreme courts to proactively address potential obstacles to the proper administration of justice in their states.³⁸

State supreme courts regularly invoke their supervisory power to address a range of issues. Many applications are managerial, like overseeing judiciary personnel, controlling lower courts’ workloads, and supervising courts’ general operations.³⁹ But supreme courts also regularly use their supervisory power for broader purposes, including to improve state legal processes in an array of ways.⁴⁰

Election contests present a particularly apt use of supervisory power. Such litigation can disrupt democratic processes if not resolved quickly, but because these time pressures are foreseeable, they can be planned for in advance. Through supervisory power, courts can establish procedures that will apply uniformly if and when contests arise.⁴¹ Moreover, because election contests often require coordination among courts, election officials, and other actors, the supervisory power’s flexibility allows supreme courts to prepare a coordinated response for the judiciary as a whole.⁴² Especially in a hyper-partisan environment, establishing clear procedures and expectations beforehand, rather than developing them on the fly as a contest unfolds, can also help to avoid accusations of bias toward a particular candidate or political party.

The Arizona Supreme Court provides an example of how supervisory power can ensure timely resolution of election contests. Going into the 2024 election, Arizona law already imposed a relatively accelerated timeline for contests: a hearing must be set within ten days of filing, and judgment must be pronounced within five days after the hearing.⁴³ State law also required trial courts to play a role in automatic recounts, including entering orders when election officials certified that recounts were needed and later receiving and announcing the results.⁴⁴ Despite this existing framework, Arizona Chief Justice Ann Timmer—perhaps motivated by the state’s experience with multiple high-profile election contests in 2020 and 2022⁴⁵—determined that additional measures were necessary.

In October 2024, Chief Justice Timmer invoked the court’s supervisory power to issue Administrative Order 2024-199, declaring that the administration of justice requires giving priority to post-election proceedings.⁴⁶ Among other provisions, the order required trial courts to schedule proceedings so that appealable judgments would be issued in time for consideration of any appeals and potential remands, including a firm deadline for presidential elector contests to ensure compliance with the federal ECRA.⁴⁷ The order also went beyond simply mandating speed: it instructed trial courts to coordinate with election officials and their clerks to be ready for any recounts, and it authorized relief for judges who might miss mandatory deadlines in other cases due to their election-related workload.⁴⁸ No major election contests were ultimately filed in Arizona following the 2024 election, but the order demonstrates the court’s readiness to handle such disputes had they arisen.

The Michigan Supreme Court offers another example of supervisory power supporting orderly resolution of election litigation. In September 2020, the court issued Administrative Order 2020-20 to "promote the efficient and timely disposition of election-related litigation."⁴⁹ (The court has re-circulated the order ahead of subsequent elections.⁵⁰) As that broad language indicates, the order is not limited to election contests but applies to other election cases as well. Much of the order focuses on establishing communications protocols. Any election complaint must be immediately reported to several key state officials: the supreme court clerk, the director of elections, the governor’s chief legal counsel, and, when the complaint involves the state or its subdivisions, the attorney general’s office. Additionally, trial court chief judges must provide the supreme court with case details, including the assigned judge’s contact information, a brief statement of the issues, and an electronic copy of any final order. And the intermediate appellate court must publish guidance on after-hours contact procedures and emergency appellate relief.

Going further, the State Court Administrative Office’s Trial Court Administration Reference Guide, which is issued pursuant to a court rule and is binding on Michigan trial courts,⁵¹ adds one more procedural step that could significantly expedite election litigation: before issuing any order or opinion regarding election procedures, trial courts must inform the supreme court clerk of the lawsuit so the supreme court can decide whether to certify and directly answer the controlling legal question(s).⁵² However, if the supreme court declines to certify the question, the procedure requires the trial court to "proceed in handling the case without delay" and, in accordance with Order 2020-20, notify the supreme court clerk when it disposes of the case.⁵³ Michigan’s multi-layered approach demonstrates how the supervisory power enables state supreme courts to facilitate the orderly and expeditious resolution of election-related disputes.

B. Rulemaking Power

State supreme courts’ rulemaking power offers a complementary tool. This authority enables supreme courts to prescribe uniform rules of practice and procedure for their court system, including rules governing civil, appellate, and specialized proceedings—binding requirements that dictate how litigants must file appeals, submit briefs, and pursue relief.⁵⁴ Similar to the supervisory power, the rulemaking power is typically either explicitly authorized by the state constitution or state law or derived from courts’ inherent judicial authority.⁵⁵ And like the supervisory power, rulemaking power is not tethered to a particular case or controversy. This makes it particularly effective for establishing durable procedural frameworks that will govern future election contests (and potentially other election-related litigation).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provides an illustration of how rulemaking can help to expedite election litigation. In August 2024, the court invoked its constitutional rulemaking authority to temporarily accelerate its already-compressed procedures for election-related appeals in the 2024 election: the court reduced the period for filing an appeal from ten days to three, required appellants to file their brief within twenty-four hours of filing their notice of appeal, and required appellees to file their brief within twenty-four hours of the appellants’ brief.⁵⁶ It made other changes like eliminating reply briefs, including weekends and holidays in time calculations, barring separate motions to quash or dismiss appeals, requiring lower courts to transmit records "as soon as practicable," and not allowing applications for reconsideration or re-argument.⁵⁷ The court issued these rules on its own initiative, and while it cited the Electoral Count Reform Act as the impetus, the court did not limit the changes to contests involving the presidential election.⁵⁸

The Colorado Supreme Court provides another example. Going into the 2024 election cycle, Colorado’s rules of civil procedure already had a procedure specific to election contests. But in June 2024, a new state law designed to bring the state into compliance with the federal ECRA took effect, requiring the state supreme court to resolve contests over presidential electors within 24 days of the general election.⁵⁹ A few months later, in September, a justice realized that the state’s rule for election contests needed changes to conform to the new law.⁶⁰ He also identified what he described as a "hole that the legislature left open," which was a lack of notice of the contest for the state’s chief elections official, the secretary of state.⁶¹ He raised these points to the state judiciary’s civil rules committee and, using rulemaking authority provided by the new legislation, helped quickly amend the civil rule before the election.⁶²

Other state supreme courts have similarly adopted rules to facilitate expedited resolution of election litigation in ways that mirror some of the statutory provisions identified in Part I. Some require priority treatment: Florida requires trial courts to prioritize election-related cases,⁶³ and Michigan directs its intermediate appellate court to give "precedence" to election appeals.⁶⁴ Others establish specific procedural mechanisms: the Ohio Supreme Court automatically expedites briefing for election-related original actions filed within 90 days of an election,⁶⁵ while the Rhode Island Supreme Court prioritizes oral arguments in election matters.⁶⁶ Still others provide more discretionary authority: Louisiana, for example, allows its intermediate appellate court to hear election appeals en banc "when the court deems it necessary to promote justice or expedite the business of the court."⁶⁷ These examples reflect a growing recognition among state supreme courts that election disputes require advance planning rather than ad hoc responses.

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While both the supervisory and rulemaking powers enable state supreme courts to proactively reduce delays in election contests, they differ in important ways. A key distinction lies in their primary audience. Rulemaking creates binding procedural requirements for litigants, governing how—and when—litigants must file briefs and appeals. This makes it the ideal tool for establishing requirements, such as compressed briefing schedules or shortened appellate windows. The supervisory power, by contrast, primarily directs courts themselves, instructing judges on how to manage their cases and potentially coordinate with other governmental officials. This makes the supervisory power better suited for directing courts to prioritize certain types of cases over other matters, to allocate their resources, and to coordinate with other state officials who play a role in election administration.

The two powers also differ procedurally. Rulemaking typically requires formalities like notice and comment periods, making it more time-intensive but potentially more durable. Once adopted, formal rules can remain in effect until formally amended or repealed, providing stability across changes in court personnel. Supervisory orders, by contrast, can be issued more quickly and informally, making them better suited for addressing immediate needs or election-specific circumstances. This flexibility, however, may come at the cost of durability, as supervisory orders can be more easily modified or rescinded than formal rules.

Courts seeking comprehensive frameworks may need to use both powers in tandem—for instance, using rulemaking to establish procedural requirements for litigants while issuing supervisory orders to direct case prioritization and resource coordination. The examples from Arizona, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Colorado show this is possible.

III. How State Supreme Courts Might Act

State supreme courts can use their supervisory and rulemaking powers to prevent prolonged election contests like those in North Carolina and Minnesota. The need for such action is particularly urgent in states lacking deadlines for promptly resolving contests, those with multiple layers of appellate review, and those facing competitive, high-profile races in 2026. This Part explores how courts might design and implement such procedures.

A. Substantive Considerations

Courts have considerable flexibility in what substantive approach to adopt, though the overarching objective should be to resolve election contests before the relevant term of office begins. This would help prevent the uncertainty and disruption that prolonged litigation causes. At the same time, courts must respect separation of powers constraints. Where legislatures have prescribed specific procedures, such as filing deadlines, hearing schedules, or resolution timelines, supreme courts should generally defer to those legislative choices. But where statutes are silent or provide only aspirational language directing courts to act as soon as possible, courts possess broad authority to establish procedural frameworks.

Courts can pursue this objective through different mechanisms. Some courts may prefer to set clear deadlines, working backward from inauguration or swearing-in dates to ensure sufficient time for trial proceedings and appeals. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for instance, compressed appellate timelines and briefing schedules to ensure prompt resolution of any election litigation, including post-election disputes.⁶⁸ Supreme courts in states with statutory frameworks that are silent about resolving contests or that set only aspirational goals could adopt similar compressed timelines tailored to their state’s terms of office.

Other courts may emphasize coordination and resource management, as the Arizona Supreme Court did by requiring trial courts to coordinate with election officials and authorizing leniency with respect to other deadlines for judges handling election matters.⁶⁹ This approach addresses practical implementation challenges, which may be especially valuable in states that already have statutory resolution deadlines.

Still others may focus on communication protocols, as the Michigan Supreme Court did by requiring notice to the supreme court and key state officials when contests are filed.⁷⁰ This approach enables supreme courts to track emerging litigation, making it particularly helpful in states with many county- or district-level trial courts that might hear contests.

Courts may also consider establishing certification procedures that allow the supreme court to resolve controlling legal questions directly before trial courts rule, as Michigan has done.⁷¹ By enabling supreme courts to address key legal issues at the outset, this approach can eliminate the need for lengthy appellate proceedings.

Many states would benefit from combining these approaches. Courts might establish deadlines for key milestones, while also creating communication protocols that enable the supreme court to monitor developments. Such a layered approach would address both timing and coordination challenges.

B. Process Considerations

In addition to considering what substantive approaches to adopt, courts should consider when and how to develop their procedures. Two considerations are particularly important: timing of issuance and stakeholder engagement.

When courts act matters significantly. Courts that issue procedures once an election is underway risk appearing to influence outcomes or to favor specific candidates. To avoid these concerns, courts should act well in advance—before the initial election results are known, and ideally before voting begins. This would provide notice to potential litigants, election officials, and lower courts, allowing time to understand the new procedures. It would also signal that courts are acting to improve judicial administration generally, rather than trying to influence particular races.

Courts should also consider seeking input from stakeholders, including elections officials, the attorney general’s office, and private practitioners. Such consultation can improve both the quality and legitimacy of new court procedures. For courts using rulemaking power, stakeholder consultation typically occurs through notice-and-comment procedures. But even for supervisory orders, where consultation may be discretionary, soliciting input can be valuable. Stakeholders may identify practical implementation challenges that courts have not considered or suggest refinements that improve workability. Their participation in the process may also enhance acceptance of resulting procedures, particularly when new requirements affect how election officials or litigants must operate.

IV. Conclusion

State supreme courts possess constitutional authority and practical tools to prevent prolonged election contests. By establishing clear procedures in advance of any election in which they might be needed, high courts can avoid any appearance of influencing particular races, while also preventing the prolonged uncertainty other states have experienced.