Mail voting is under unprecedented federal pressure heading into the 2026 midterm elections. From the White House to the Supreme Court to Congress, a series of developments is threatening a form of voting that tens of millions of Americans rely on—and that was relatively uncontroversial until just a few years ago. This explainer examines how mail voting became a partisan battleground, what the current federal threats mean for mail voting, and what states, election officials, and advocates can do in response.
Since returning to office, President Trump has made eliminating mail voting a recurring theme. In August 2025, he wrote in a social media post that he was “going to lead a movement to get rid of MAIL-IN BALLOTS,” promising to act unilaterally by signing an executive order “to help bring HONESTY to the 2026 Midterm Elections.”1
President Trump’s hostility toward mail voting is not new. He decried the pandemic-driven surge in mail voting in 2020, and he later blamed mail voting for his loss in that year’s presidential election, citing claims of widespread fraud2—claims repeatedly rejected by courts and debunked by election officials and researchers.3 But heading into the 2026 midterm elections, developments across all three branches of the federal government have begun to translate that hostility into policy. On one front, there is a concerted push through litigation, executive action, and legislation to require that all mail ballots be received by Election Day, eliminating a widely used practice that allows ballots received after Election Day to be counted so long as they were mailed by Election Day. On another front, a series of developments involving the Postal Service itself has raised serious questions about whether the agency can continue to serve as a reliable—and neutral—carrier of election mail.
Taken together, these developments represent a level of federal pressure on mail voting that has no recent precedent. This explainer explores these developments. It first provides context for the shift in partisan views toward mail voting, then examines these developments in detail, and finally identifies steps that states, election officials, and advocacy organizations may consider taking in response.
While partisan fights over election rules are nothing new in the United States, mail voting was relatively uncontroversial until the 2020 presidential election. That year, views toward mail voting took a sharp partisan turn that has only intensified since—and has given rise to concerns that a hostile administration could leverage the Postal Service itself against the practice.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated an already-growing trend toward mail voting. Nearly half of all Americans ultimately cast their ballots by mail that year, more than doubling the number from the prior presidential election, as states across the political spectrum embraced the practice as a solution to reduce the public health risks of in-person voting.4
But not everyone welcomed the expansion of mail voting. President Trump and some Republican allies argued openly that more accessible mail voting would encourage higher voter turnout at the expense of Republicans.5 President Trump began attacking the practice, claiming without evidence that it was vulnerable to widespread fraud.6 These claims, though widely debunked by election officials, courts, and researchers,7 nonetheless took hold among a significant portion of the Republican base.8
In the years that followed, mail voting policy became an increasingly partisan fault line. On one side, Democrats and voting rights advocates have pushed to expand mail voting through legislation and litigation challenging practices they perceived as overly restrictive.9 On the other side, Republicans and allied organizations have passed laws restricting mail voting and pursued legal challenges to practices they perceived as threatening the integrity of the process,10 leaving mail voting as one of the more contested policies in American election law today.
President Trump’s attacks on mail voting in 2020 also gave rise to a separate but related concern: that the Postal Service, under the leadership of an ally of the President, might be leveraged against the practice. When newly appointed Postmaster General Louis DeJoy announced a series of cost-cutting measures projected to slow mail delivery ahead of the 2020 election, many observers worried the changes would delay mail delivery enough to prevent ballots from arriving on time.11 Facing public outcry, congressional pressure, and legal challenges, DeJoy suspended the measures until after the November election.12 The Postal Service ultimately handled the 2020 election reasonably well, with a Stanford-MIT study finding on-time processing rates of around 90% to 95% in the days leading up to Election Day, though some regions experienced more significant delays.13
As the 2024 presidential election approached, concerns about the impact of the Postal Service’s cost-cutting measures resurfaced once again. State and local election officials publicly expressed concerns to Postmaster DeJoy about misdelivery of ballots, unusually long delivery times, and an increase in election mail being marked as undeliverable.14 DeJoy again responded by postponing the mail processing consolidation efforts and announcing steps to prioritize election mail.15 The Postal Service reported strong delivery performance following the 2024 election,16 but the underlying tensions over mail voting showed no signs of abating.
Those tensions only deepened heading into the 2026 election cycle. DeJoy stepped down as Postmaster General in March 2025,17 and David Steiner, another ally of the President, took charge in July 2025.18 Under this new leadership, the Postal Service proceeded with the consolidation efforts it had previously postponed and went further, finalizing a rule change about how mail is postmarked in ways that could affect the timeliness of election mail.19 Meanwhile, President Trump has intensified his calls to eliminate the practice, and his administration—and supporters in the Republican Party—have taken a series of steps, described in the next Part, that have raised serious concerns about the continued efficacy of mail voting.
Heading into the 2026 midterm elections, mail voting remains one of the most contested issues in American election law. What is new this cycle is the breadth and intensity of federal pressure against the practice. One major conflict involves litigation, executive action, and proposed bills seeking to require that all mail ballots be received by Election Day. These efforts would eliminate the common practice of counting mail ballots received after Election Day so long as they were mailed by Election Day, which could disenfranchise unwitting voters. A second major challenge involves the use of the Postal Service itself as an instrument for restricting mail voting. Together, these represent a level of federal pressure on mail voting that has no recent precedent.
The effort to require mail ballots to be received by Election Day could have significant consequences for voters across the country and abroad, including members of the military and their families. While media coverage has often reported that 14 states and Washington, D.C. allow ballots to arrive after Election Day—jurisdictions that represent 43% of voters in the 2024 election20—this figure overlooks state laws that extend similar grace periods to military and overseas voters.21 Including those states, 29 states and Washington, D.C. currently allow at least some voters to return mail ballots after Election Day so long as they were mailed by Election Day.22
The most significant challenge to current practice is a case pending before the United States Supreme Court, Watson v. Republican National Committee, which challenges the legality of accepting mail ballots after Election Day. Watson concerns a Mississippi law that allows ballots to be received up to five business days after Election Day as long as they are postmarked by Election Day.23 The Republican National Committee (RNC) argues that allowing ballots to arrive after Election Day undermines public confidence in elections and that federal law sets a specific date for federal elections—the Tuesday after the first Monday in November—and therefore requires all ballots to be received by that date.24 A federal trial court upheld the Mississippi law in July 2024,25 but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision in October 2024, siding with the RNC.26
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and held oral argument in March 2026.27 Coverage of the argument generally described the Court’s six conservative justices as appearing poised to strike down Mississippi’s law.28 Legal experts, however, have roundly criticized the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that the Court could rely upon, noting that the same logic could even call into question states’ early voting laws.29 A decision is expected by the end of the current term in June 2026.30 (Similar lawsuits have been brought by Republican candidates against other states, but Watson will likely be the decisive case on this issue.31) If the Court rules against Mississippi, the other 28 states and Washington, D.C. would presumably have to scramble to change their laws before the midterms, potentially affecting millions of voters who have previously relied on the extended grace period to cast their ballots.
The White House is likewise attempting to end the counting of ballots that were timely completed but received after election day. In March 2025, President Trump issued an executive order that, among other provisions, directed the Attorney General to block states from counting mail ballots received after Election Day and directed the Election Assistance Commission to condition states’ federal funding on compliance with that requirement.32 The executive order cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Watson as part of its legal justification.33 However, multiple federal courts have blocked the executive order’s provisions, concluding that federal law does not bar states from counting ballots received after Election Day—conclusions that could be affected by Watson—and does not authorize the President to interpret or enforce such a deadline.34
Congressional Republicans have joined the effort, as well, proposing bills that would impose sweeping new requirements on how states administer federal elections. The most far-reaching of these is the Make Elections Great Again (MEGA) Act.35 Among other provisions, it would require that all mail ballots for federal elections be received by Election Day.36 It would also make other significant changes to mail voting policy, including imposing a photo ID requirement to request and cast a mail ballot, prohibit states from automatically mailing ballots to all registered voters, prohibiting states from allowing voters to make a one-time request to receive mail ballots for future elections without submitting a new request for each election, and limiting both who can return someone else’s mail ballot and the number of ballots a person can return.37 So far, the MEGA Act has not passed either the House or the Senate.38
While none of these efforts have yet succeeded at a nationwide level, the federal pressure has had a downstream impact on states. Four states—Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah—passed legislation in 2025 eliminating their post-Election Day grace periods and moving their mail ballot receipt deadlines to Election Day.39 The Ohio example is particularly illustrative. Citing the prospect of a Supreme Court ruling in Watson that could strike down the state’s four-day grace period, Ohio’s Republican governor said he wished he could veto the bill but signed it “reluctantly.”40 The state’s Republican attorney general separately added that the Justice Department had threatened to sue Ohio under President Trump’s March 2025 executive order if it did not eliminate the grace period.41
The federal pressure extends beyond efforts to require Election Day receipt of mail ballots. A separate set of developments—some deliberate, some stemming from judicial decisions—has made the Postal Service itself a focal point in the fight over mail voting. These developments range from White House efforts to explicitly use the Postal Service as a gatekeeper for who can vote by mail, to operational changes that have slowed mail delivery and delayed the postmarking of mail, to a Supreme Court decision that has heightened concerns that the Postal Service might intentionally withhold election mail, to a looming threat to the Postal Service’s institutional independence. Together, they raise serious questions about whether the Postal Service can continue to serve as a reliable and neutral carrier of election mail.
A March 2026 executive order offers perhaps the clearest statement of the Trump administration’s intentions with the Postal Service. The executive order aims to use the Postal Service as a gatekeeper for who can vote by mail. Among other provisions, it directs the Postal Service to initiate rulemaking that would prohibit the Postal Service from transmitting mail ballots to any citizen unless they are “enrolled” on a “Mail-In and Absentee Participation List.”42 The Postal Service would maintain this list, while states could supplement it.43 The order further directs the rulemaking to require all mail ballots be sent in a special Postal Service-designed envelope marked as “Official Election Mail” and bearing a unique Intelligent Mail barcode or equivalent.44 Ballot mail not in the special envelope—which, just months out from the start of mail voting, does not yet exist—would presumably be invalid under the order.45
Despite the executive order’s ambition, election officials and experts widely believe the mail voting policies envisioned by the executive order will not take effect.46 As a practical matter, there almost certainly is not enough time before the 2026 midterms for the Postal Service to complete the rulemaking process required by the order and for states to then make the changes necessary to implement the resulting rules.47 Indeed, Justice Department filings from early May 2026—more than a month after the order was issued—indicated that the federal agencies tasked with implementing the order had not yet taken any steps to do so.48
Moreover, the order faces constitutional obstacles. Election administration is primarily the province of the states under the U.S. Constitution,49 and federal courts have already blocked President Trump’s earlier attempt to direct states on how they administer their elections without congressional authority to do so.50 As many election officials and experts have pointed out, nothing in the statutes cited in the order gives the President or the Postal Service the authority to determine who can cast a mail ballot or to condition the transmission of ballots on states’ compliance with federal requirements.51 Further, nothing in federal law gives the President the authority to direct the actions and policy determinations of the Postal Service.52 Congress could, in theory, give the President these powers, but it has not done so.
Several lawsuits challenging the latest order have already been filed,53 and legal experts believe the order will either be blocked before any of its mail voting policies are implemented or simply never materialize due to a lack of time.54 To date, one federal district court has denied some of the plaintiff groups’ requests to preliminarily enjoin the executive order, though it did so on the basis that it would be premature in light of the fact that governmental agencies have not yet taken any steps to implement the order; the court left open the ability to pursue relief “if and when” any actions are taken.55 Because of these circumstances, some commentators have suggested that the order’s primary purpose may be to create uncertainty rather than policy, and that its real impact may be the confusion it sows among voters and election officials in the meantime.56
Against the backdrop of the executive order, the Postal Service has been quietly implementing changes that appear to be already slowing mail delivery times. As described in Part I, the Postal Service has been attempting to consolidate its mail processing network since at least 2020, when then-Postmaster General Louis DeJoy announced a series of cost-cutting measures that included closing local mail processing facilities and routing mail through centralized hubs.57 Iterations of those plans were postponed before the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections.58 In 2025, however, the Postal Service proceeded with consolidation efforts that, while apparently scaled back from the original announcement, have nonetheless resulted in significant changes to how mail is processed.59
The consolidation efforts are likely to yield longer and less predictable mail delivery times.60 Rather than being processed locally, mail must now travel to a potentially distant processing facility before it can be sorted and delivered—a journey that can add one, two, or more days to the process.61 A Brookings Institution study found that nearly 50% of post offices are now located more than 100 miles from their nearest processing center, sometimes in neighboring states, with rural and small-town post offices bearing the greatest impact.62
Early effects on election mail have already been documented. A study of California’s special statewide election in November 2025—the state’s first statewide election held after the consolidation took effect—found that the rate of late-arriving ballots was on average four times higher than in the 2024 election, with rural counties seeing the steepest increases.63 While based on a single state’s experience, the finding is cause for significant concern ahead of the 2026 midterms. This is particularly true in light of the looming Watson decision discussed in the previous section; if the Supreme Court requires all states to receive mail ballots by Election Day, the consolidation-driven delivery delays experienced in California could affect voters across the country, with no grace period to protect them.
Compounding the impact of the mail processing network’s consolidation, the Postal Service finalized a rule at the end of 2025 that formalized a policy of not necessarily postmarking a mailpiece (Postal Service terminology for any piece of mail) on the date it was first received.64 Prior to this rule, a postmark had been widely understood to indicate the date on which the Postal Service first received a mailpiece. But under the new rule, a postmark will confirm only that the Postal Service accepted custody of the mailpiece and that it was in the Postal Service’s possession on the identified date.65
The Postal Service said it issued the rule—its first ever formal definition of a postmark—to “improve public understanding” about the meaning of postmarks.66 Critics, however, have argued that the rule formalizes rather than attempts to remedy the delays created by the consolidation effort.67 Moreover, the practical effect, when combined with the ongoing consolidation effort, is that many mailpieces will not be postmarked until they arrive at a processing facility, which may be one, two, or more days after the Postal Service initially receives them.
While a variety of sectors rely on postmarks for determining compliance with deadlines, the implications of these postmarking delays are particularly consequential for voting. As discussed above, many states will accept ballots received a set number of days after Election Day as long as they were mailed by Election Day, a fact that states determine by referencing the postmark on the ballot. Delays in postmarking could mean that a ballot mailed on or even a few days before Election Day would not receive a postmark until after Election Day and would be deemed untimely. Of course, this concern could become moot if the Supreme Court rules in Watson that all mail ballots must be received by Election Day.
The same is true for voter registration forms submitted through the mail. While most states provide individuals with many ways to register to vote, including in person or online, voters always also have the option to register by mail. Thirty-eight states rely on postmarks for determining whether a mailed voter registration form was submitted on time.68 Several of these states allow for other voter registration opportunities beyond the deadline for registration by mail, meaning that a person whose mailed registration was not timely postmarked would, in theory, have other opportunities to register.69 But for most of these states, the postmark deadline coincides with the state’s deadline for registering to vote by any method, and delays in postmarking mailed voter registration forms could result in voters being ineligible to vote in that election.70
Separately, some commentators have expressed concern that election-related mail could be intentionally delayed or not delivered at all, either at the whim of individual postal workers or at the direction of officials in the Postal Service or executive branch. While postal employees generally carry out their duties faithfully—and the American Postal Workers Union has pushed back against efforts by the first and second Trump administrations to limit mail voting71—the sheer volume of mail handled by the Postal Service means that mistakes and, in rare cases, intentional misconduct do occur. For instance, a mail carrier in New Jersey admitted to discarding more than 1,800 pieces of mail into dumpsters in 2020, including 99 general election ballots.72 And a mail carrier in Puerto Rico was convicted in 2025 for unlawfully withholding four pieces of mail containing ballots during a 2022 special election, leaving those voters unable to cast a ballot at all.73
A February 2026 Supreme Court decision, United States Postal Service v. Konan, has heightened these concerns by making clear that citizens cannot sue the federal government for monetary damages when postal employees intentionally fail to deliver their mail.74 The decision has drawn particular attention in the election context, given President Trump’s open hostility to mail voting.
The core worry is that, without the threat of federal tort liability, postal workers or executive officials might feel emboldened to target or tamper with election mail. Observers had anticipated scenarios like this even before the Konan decision.75 When Konan was announced, legal commentator Mark Joseph Stern argued that the decision “could not have arrived at a worse time” given the Trump administration’s efforts to assert executive branch control over U.S. elections ahead of the 2026 midterms.76 In his view, the decision removes a legal check at precisely the moment when the need for such checks may be greatest.77 Echoing this sentiment, election law expert Rick Hasen, while reflecting on the March 2026 executive order, wrote that the combination of the executive order and the Konan decision would likely fuel voters’ fears that the Postal Service could “sabotage their ballots.”78
A final concern is the threat to the institutional independence of the Postal Service itself—and what a less independent Postal Service might mean for the future of mail voting. For over 50 years, the Postal Service has operated as an independent federal agency, insulated from direct presidential control; it was previously a cabinet level agency until Congress reorganized it as an independent agency in 1970.79 It is governed by an 11-member Board of Governors, most of whom are appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, serve fixed terms set by Congress, and can be removed only for cause.80 But that structure could soon change, with potentially significant consequences for election mail.
President Trump has already shown interest in changing the Postal Service’s independent structure. During his first term, the Trump administration proposed privatizing the Postal Service, though the idea proved unpopular with members of Congress from both parties.81 In February 2025, the Washington Post reported that President Trump was preparing an executive order to fire the members of the Postal Service’s Board of Governors and place the agency under the control of the Commerce Department.82 The White House denied that an executive order was in the works,83 but President Trump confirmed that he was indeed considering merging the Postal Service with the Commerce Department84—a move that some believed would be a step toward privatizing the agency.85 Still, experts note that such a merger could not be accomplished through an executive order and would instead require an act of Congress.86
A separate and more immediate threat comes from a pending Supreme Court case, Trump v. Slaughter, which could give the President far greater control over the Postal Service without any act of Congress.87 At issue is whether the President has the constitutional authority to remove the heads of independent federal agencies without cause, and whether the Court should adhere to its 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which held that Congress could insulate certain agency heads from at-will presidential removal.88 The Postal Service is directly implicated because it is structured similarly to the agency at issue in Slaughter. If the Court holds that the President can remove independent agency heads at will, the President would likely have the same power over members of the Postal Service’s Board of Governors, allowing him to replace them with political allies and wield substantial influence over postal policies and operations, including those affecting election mail.89
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Together, these developments paint a striking picture of a sustained effort, involving all three branches of the federal government, to restrict mail voting. This effort is occurring against the backdrop of President Trump’s years-long campaign to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the country’s elections and his second administration’s broader push to exert greater federal control over how states administer elections. Whether these efforts ultimately succeed in reshaping mail voting before the 2026 midterms remains to be seen. But for voters, election officials, and advocates who believe mail voting should remain a viable option, the developments described above underscore the urgency of the responses discussed in the next Part.
The developments described in this explainer present real challenges for voters and election officials alike. While no single response can fully address all of the concerns raised, there are steps that states, election officials, and advocacy organizations may consider taking to reduce the risks described above.
As the history described in Part I suggests, the Postal Service has previously been responsive to public and political pressure. Both in 2020 and 2024, the Postal Service took significant steps—including postponing consolidation efforts and deploying extraordinary measures to prioritize election mail—in response to concerns raised by election officials and the public.90 States, election officials, and advocacy organizations may all wish to engage directly with their local Postal Service contacts and with the Postal Service’s national leadership to express any concerns about mail delivery times and postmarking delays in the lead-up to the 2026 midterms.
There is also reason to believe the Postal Service may be open to operational adjustments in response to specific concerns. In the course of issuing the postmark rule, the Postal Service noted public comments it received recommending operational and staffing changes during times of year with high volumes of mail.91 Suggested changes included deploying extra staff and dedicating windows at post offices to manually postmark mail during these busy seasons.92 The Postal Service did not commit to any of these changes, but indicated that if there appeared to be a need, it would consider making appropriate adjustments.93 With that opening in mind, interested parties may wish to stay in regular contact with their local and regional post offices, keep them apprised of expected mail volume in the lead-up to key election deadlines, and formally request any accommodations that may be necessary.
Another response that states, election officials, and advocacy organizations may wish to consider is to increase public education efforts about the heightened risks of mail delays this election cycle and the steps voters can take to protect themselves. One such step is to urge voters not to wait until close to Election Day to mail their ballots. The Postal Service, among others, has long recommended that voters mail their ballots at least one week before the return deadline,94 and that advice is more important than ever given the likelihood of delays. Additionally, voters who want a postmark reflecting the date their mail was first received by the Postal Service—rather than the date it was processed at a potentially distant processing center—can request a manual postmark at any post office for no cost. However, this requires a trip to a post office during business hours, which may not be practical for all voters. Finally, interested parties may wish to remind voters of the alternative voting options discussed below, including hand-delivering ballots and voting in person where feasible.
Of course, there are limits to this approach, as public attention to informational efforts can be elusive or uneven. Voters who are most at risk—such as those in rural areas, or those who habitually wait until close to deadlines—may be the hardest to reach.
Another response is to encourage voters who are able to do so to consider alternatives to mailing their ballot and registration forms, including hand-delivering their ballots or voting in person. For mail ballots, voters can typically hand-deliver their ballots directly to election officials or to drop boxes, or have a designated person do so on their behalf, though the rules governing third-party ballot delivery vary by state.95 States and election officials may also consider expanding drop box availability and in-person early voting periods to make these options more accessible.96 For voter registration, alternatives include hand-delivering registration forms to election officials or taking advantage of other registration options, such as in-person or online registration.97
There are significant limitations to this approach, however. For many voters—particularly those in rural areas, those with disabilities, those with limited transportation, or those who rely on mail voting precisely because in-person options are less accessible—avoiding the mail may simply not be realistic. And expanding drop box availability, early voting periods, or other alternatives may require legislative action that is not always viable.
Another response for states, election officials, and advocacy organizations is to familiarize themselves with—and potentially strengthen—existing criminal prohibitions against interfering with election mail. These prohibitions exist at both the federal and state level and represent an important but overlooked tool for deterring interference with mail voting.
At the federal level, officials should be aware that meaningful criminal prohibitions already exist. A Postal Service employee who unlawfully “secretes, destroys, detains, delays, or opens” any mail entrusted to them can face a fine, up to five years in prison, or both.98 A related provision makes it a crime for a postal employee to voluntarily abandon mail before delivering it to its intended destination, punishable by a fine or up to a year in prison.99 And as noted in the discussion of the Konan decision above, postal employees have been prosecuted for such conduct in the past, including in connection with election mail.
Officials should also familiarize themselves with state-level protections, which vary from state to state. Some states have enacted laws that specifically criminalize interference with the delivery of ballots, including, for example, destroying ballots or failing to deliver them.100 Other states have laws that more broadly protect against interference with the right to vote, which, while not specifically directed at mail interference, could still apply to a ballot destruction or non-delivery scenario.101 And states that lack specific protections against interference with election mail may wish to consider enacting them.
These criminal prohibitions provide a meaningful deterrent against interference with election mail, and states, election officials, and advocacy organizations should consider actively publicizing their existence as part of a broader effort to reassure voters and discourage bad actors. For voters who rely on mail voting and are feeling anxious about the developments described in this explainer, knowing that postal employees face serious criminal liability for interfering with their ballots may provide some measure of reassurance, and that reassurance has real value in the current moment. It bears noting, however, that criminal prosecution does not restore a lost vote or compensate an affected voter, and that enforcement depends on prosecutorial will at both the federal and state levels. But as a tool for deterrence and public communication, these laws are worth knowing and highlighting.
Beyond criminal prohibitions, litigation is another tool for protecting election mail—and one that has proven effective in the past. In 2020, numerous lawsuits were filed against the Postal Service over concerns about timely delivery of mail ballots ahead of the presidential election.102 As an example, the NAACP brought a federal suit challenging several mail delivery policies that then-Postmaster General DeJoy had just announced, alleging that the Postal Service bypassed required federal procedures for making such changes.103 A federal court blocked the policies in October 2020.104 When the Postal Service did not immediately comply, the NAACP pursued enforcement proceedings, resulting in orders requiring the Postal Service to prioritize delivery of ballots and conduct sweeps of mail processing facilities in key states105—sweeps that turned up 815 ballots in Texas alone.106
Whether similar litigation could succeed in 2026 is less certain, though still worth considering. The 2020 suits succeeded in part because the Postal Service had announced significant policy changes without following required federal procedures—a procedural hook that may not be available this time, given that the Postal Service appears to have followed the required rulemaking process for the postmark rule change. That said, other legal theories may present themselves depending on how events unfold in the lead-up to the midterms; for instance, if evidence emerges of systemic failures to deliver election mail on time, or if the Postal Service—or executive branch—takes actions that appear to target election mail specifically. Given the compressed timeline before the November elections, monitoring developments and preparing to respond rapidly will be essential.
As the 2026 midterms approach, the developments described in this explainer paint a striking picture of a federal government opposing mail voting. Some of these developments may yet be blocked or resolved by November. But others are already having measurable effects, and the weight of this pressure represents a genuine threat to a form of voting that tens of millions of Americans rely on.
These developments do not have to go unanswered. States, election officials, and advocacy organizations have options available to them, from engaging directly with the Postal Service to request operational accommodations, to educating voters about the importance of mailing ballots early and the availability of alternatives like drop boxes and in-person voting, to monitoring mail delivery times and evaluating whether litigation is warranted if systemic problems emerge. None of these responses is a complete solution, but for those committed to protecting access to mail voting in 2026, they represent a sound place to start.