Explainer: State Tools to Address Federal Corruption

Bryna Godar, Staff Attorney
PDF Available Here
Published: December 9, 2025

Federal laws and institutions have long played a central role in addressing public corruption. Federal prosecutors have brought cases involving a range of officials and misconduct—from local leaders soliciting bribes for marijuana licenses,[1] to members of Congress laundering campaign funds or accepting payments to aid businessmen,[2] to executive officials reporting false stock ownership information or inflating government contracts to obtain jobs for family members.[3]

In recent months, however, the section of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) that prosecutes public corruption cases has shrunk from 36 attorneys to two,[4] and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has dismantled its public corruption team.[5] These moves signal a de-prioritization of these cases, but they do not reflect the absence of corrupt conduct or public interest in addressing it. To the contrary, the public is increasingly questioning the ethics and legality of various federal actions, from the president accepting a $400 million jet from Qatar,[6] to allegations that a soon-to-be administration official accepted a bag of $50,000 in cash in exchange for facilitating government contracts,[7] to claims that the Department of Homeland Security is awarding large contracts to firms with close ties to its senior officials,[8] and more.[9]

This explainer considers the potential for states to play a more central role in addressing public corruption. All fifty states have laws criminalizing various forms of corruption, such as bribing public officials, using information obtained in public office for personal gain, or accepting compensation for past official actions. These laws often address a wider range of conduct than federal anti-corruption laws,[10] and they allow states to address both public and private corruption without requiring federal prosecutors to bring a case.

To date, the vast majority of state public corruption prosecutions have involved misconduct by state or local officials—and the need for such prosecutions may rise to the extent federal enforcement declines. But beyond addressing public corruption at the state and local levels, state law also provides an underexplored pathway for deterring and punishing corrupt conduct at the federal level, especially when federal prosecutors decline to intervene.

Part I of this explainer describes the types of state anti-corruption laws that might apply to corrupt federal conduct. These range from statutes that explicitly cover federal officials to those that encompass corrupt conduct by any actor. To make the analysis more concrete, the explainer refers to hypothetical scenarios as well as recently reported episodes to illustrate possible applications. The use of these illustrative examples is not meant to express a view on the viability or advisability of any particular state prosecution or other action. The in-depth factual investigations and state-specific legal analyses necessary to make such assessments are beyond the scope of this explainer.

Part II then turns to legal hurdles and procedural complexities that state anti-corruption actions against federal actors may face, including claims of immunity, due process challenges, and questions of venue and jurisdiction. Drawing on a related explainer on states’ ability to prosecute federal officials,[11] Part II explains that where federal officials are engaged in corruption, it is unlikely that they would be able to shield themselves from state criminal prosecutions under existing immunity principles.[12] Part II also delves into the procedural complexities of state anti-corruption cases against federal actors, discussing removal from state to federal court and outlining the scope of state criminal jurisdiction. Part III then provides a brief overview of state-level mechanisms beyond criminal law that might be used to address at least some federal corruption, including disclosure rules, unfair competition laws, and state ethics commission investigations.

I. State anti-corruption statutes that apply to federal corruption

State criminal anti-corruption statutes cover a wide range of corrupt conduct, including bribery, extortion, misusing confidential information for private gain, trading in public office, and much more. The details of these laws vary state to state. Many apply specifically to conduct involving “public servants” or “public officials” and often define those terms to encompass only state and local officials. But some state statutes expressly cover federal officials, and others criminalize corrupt behavior by anyone, thereby encompassing federal officials as well.

The sections below discuss four ways that existing state statutes may apply to federal corruption:

• First, a few states define “public servant” or “public official” to include federal officials (in addition to state and local officials). As such, these states’ anti-corruption statutes explicitly cover federal officials and anyone who corruptly interacts with a federal official.
• Second, in states where “public officials” only include state and local officials, public corruption statutes can still come into play when a federal official corruptly interacts with state or local officials, such as by offering bribes, giving unlawful gratuities, or threatening a public official. These statutes require a state or local official on one side of the interaction but can involve anyone—including a federal official—on the other side.
• Third, many states have commercial bribery statutes that could apply to federal officials who corruptly interact with employees of private corporations or other entities. Additionally, some state commercial bribery statutes define “employee” to include both private and public employees, which may result in further coverage of corruption involving federal actors.
• Fourth, state statutes prohibiting various forms of extortion, coercion, threats, and other similar actions often apply to anyone and do not purport to exempt federal officials.

A. Statutes expressly criminalizing federal official corruption

Many states have anti-corruption statutes that expressly apply to corruption involving “public officials” or “public servants.” As noted above, states most often define these terms to cover only state and local officials.[13] Colorado, Indiana, and Maine, however, explicitly define the term “public servant” to include federal officials.^[14] This means that these statutes, by their terms, apply to federal officials engaged in corrupt acts and to those who corruptly interact with federal officials. On at least one recent occasion from 2024, prosecutors did in fact use Colorado’s law to charge a federal actor with official misconduct.[15]

In these states and others, public official corruption statutes fall into two broad categories: (1) those that impose liability on public officials for their own misconduct that occurs independent of any other actor, such as official misconduct^[16] or misuse of official information for private gain;^[17] and (2) those that impose liability based on a corrupt interaction between a public official and someone else, such as bribery,^[18] unlawful gratuities,^[19] or improper efforts to influence a public official.^[20]

For example, Colorado’s first-degree official misconduct statute prohibits public officials from “knowingly” committing an unauthorized act, refraining from performing a duty imposed by law, or violating a statute or rule, either “with intent to obtain a benefit for the public servant or another or maliciously to cause harm to another.”^[21] Such official misconduct statutes can encompass a wide range of conduct,[22] from a prosecutor submitting false information to benefit a well-connected friend[23] to officials closing lanes on a bridge during rush-hour to punish a political rival.[24] If federal officials were to withhold statutorily mandated funds to punish a university for actions or views the officials disfavored, that could potentially meet the offense elements.[25]

Similarly, misuse-of-information statutes typically prohibit public officials from using “information obtained by virtue of the public servant’s office” to make financial decisions or advise another person on financial decisions.^[26] Thus, if a federal official were to buy or sell stocks before announcing an economic policy that would boost the market (or advise friends or relatives to do so), that could fall under this provision.[27]

Other public corruption statutes focus on an interaction between a public official and someone else, but only one of the people needs to be culpable. These statutes typically impose separate liability for the public official (e.g., for soliciting or accepting a bribe[28]) and the other individual (e.g., for offering or paying a bribe^[29]). For example, Colorado’s bribery statute criminalizes “offer[ing], confer[ring], or agree[ing] to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant with the intent to influence the public servant’s vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his official capacity.”^[30] On the other side, it criminalizes a public servant “solicit[ing], accept[ing], or agree[ing] to accept any pecuniary benefit upon an agreement or understanding” that his actions will be influenced.^[31] The first part of this statute could conceivably reach a law firm offering to provide millions of dollars in pro bono services to a federal official’s favored causes with the goal of influencing the official’s actions toward the firm.[32] In fact, some members of Congress have suggested that law firms’ deals with the Trump Administration may have violated both state and federal corruption law.[33] The second part would potentially reach a federal official asking the firm for those services in exchange for more favorable treatment. Similarly, state bribery statutes could reach instances where individuals or companies donate millions to an inauguration fund or political organizations in exchange for pardons, government jobs, the dismissal of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions, or other favorable treatment.[34]

Other statutes do not require an explicit quid pro quo transaction. Maine’s “Improper Gifts to Public Servants” statute, for example, criminalizes a public servant soliciting or accepting “any pecuniary benefit” if they “know[] or reasonably should know” that the gift is intended to influence the public servant’s actions “or is intended as a reward for action on the part of the public servant.”^[35] For example, a federal official accepting a $400 million luxury jet from a foreign government while saying that the gift was because of the official’s past actions providing security to the foreign country could run afoul of this statute.[36]

The specific application of these Colorado, Indiana, and Maine laws would of course depend on the details of the alleged corruption and where the corrupt acts took place,[37] as well as possible immunities (including presidential immunities) discussed further in Part II. However, because these state laws expressly include federal officials in their definition of public officials, they potentially cover a wide range of federal corruption and misconduct.

B. Statutes criminalizing corrupt interactions with state and local public officials

In states with anti-corruption statutes that define “public official” to include only state and local officials, opportunities to pursue federal-level corruption are more limited. But such laws may still reach federal corruption where a federal official corruptly interacts with a state or local official.

As outlined in the previous section, public corruption statutes apply to conduct such as bribery,^[38] improper gifts or compensation,^[39] financially motivated appointments to public office,^[40] and improper influence or threats toward a public official.^[41] When such corrupt interactions occur, liability typically attaches not just to the state or local official, but also to the other participant—e.g., the person who pays the bribe or makes the threat.^[42] Because these laws do not typically restrict who that other person can be, any federal actor who corruptly interacts with a state or local official could potentially be liable under these statutes.

These statutes vary widely in their content and scope. Every state criminalizes standard quid pro quo bribery, thereby encompassing any efforts by federal officials to directly bribe state and local officials. But many states also criminalize other types of public official corruption, including non-pecuniary exchanges, “gifts” for past actions, and other forms of improper influence or threats toward public officials.

First, the benefit involved in a corrupt exchange can, in some states, go beyond pecuniary benefits. New York’s bribery statutes, for example, prohibit conferring “any benefit” on a state or local public official to influence the official’s actions.^[43] A “benefit” is defined as “any gain or advantage”^[44] and need not be an item with monetary value—it can include things like avoiding professional consequences for an error, boosting a political campaign, or sex.^[45] The DOJ’s decision to drop federal corruption charges against New York Mayor Eric Adams provides an example of how this statute could potentially be implicated. A decision not to pursue criminal charges qualifies as a “benefit” under New York law.[46] And if that benefit is conferred on a state or local public servant “upon an agreement or understanding” that their actions “will thereby be influenced,” that would appear to violate New York’s bribery statutes.[47] In Adams’s case, for example, the judge suggested that the dismissal constituted a “bargain … in exchange for immigration policy concessions” by Adams.[48]

Second, some state anti-corruption laws do not require an explicit quid pro quo. As with the Maine example in the prior section, some statutes prohibit gifts or compensation for past action.[49] Unlike a bribe, gratuities do not involve a preexisting agreement to do something in exchange for a payment or benefit; rather, they are essentially a “thank you” gift after the fact.[50] For example, if a federal official were to give a state legislator a lavish trip to thank the legislator for supporting a specific bill, that could run afoul of these provisions. The legislator need not have previously agreed to accept the trip in exchange for supporting the bill.

Third, numerous state statutes specifically address improper influence of or threats toward state and local officials. These statutes are frequently framed as coercion statutes, prohibiting using intimidation, threats, or force to compel a public official to act or refrain from acting in a certain way.[51] Some of these statutes are limited to threats of bodily harm,^[52] while others cover threats of pecuniary harm^[53] or using “menace, deception, concealment of facts, or other corrupt means” to influence a state official.^[54] These statutes could potentially apply to situations where a federal official threatens financial or physical harm to a state legislator, judge, or other official with the purpose of influencing their actions. Section I.D discusses general coercion statutes in more depth.

Overall, state statutes cover a wide range of corrupt behavior directed toward state and local public officials. If federal officials corruptly interact with state and local officials, these statutes may offer a path for holding those officials accountable, whether the corruption is one-sided or mutual.

C. Commercial bribery statutes

In addition to public corruption statutes, many states also have “commercial bribery” statutes that commonly apply to kickbacks and other corrupt business schemes. Commercial bribery statutes typically involve “(1) the offering, conferring, soliciting, or accepting; (2) by or upon the employee or agent of an employer or principal; (3) any benefit; (4) ‘with the purpose of influencing the conduct of the employee, [or] agent’; (5) ‘relating to his employer’s or principal’s affairs’; (6) ‘when it is done without the knowledge or consent of the employer or principal.’”[55] As with the statutes outlined in the previous section, these statutes allow for liability for either the bribe giver/offeror or the bribe solicitor/receiver.

Depending on the state, federal officials could potentially be involved on either side of these interactions. Most clearly, commercial bribery statutes apply to anyone—including a federal official—who seeks to bribe an employee or agent of a private business. For example, if a federal official paid a company employee for covert access to the company’s private data, that could be covered.[56]

Additionally, some states’ commercial bribery statutes apply to both private and public employees.[57] In these states, there would potentially be liability for a private actor bribing a federal official as a public employee and/or for the federal official being bribed. For example, courts have concluded that New York’s commercial bribery statute can cover schemes to corruptly influence the conduct of out-of-state public officials, including foreign officials.[58] However, most states lack case law on this issue, and some state statutes only cover bribes directed to or received by the employees of private businesses.[59] In these states, commercial bribery statutes would reach federal corruption only if a federal official is bribing a private employee.

The scope of state commercial bribery statutes varies in other ways as well. Some statutes apply only to pecuniary exchanges while others encompass non-pecuniary benefits.[60] Some require evidence of economic loss[61] or a showing of intent for the employee to violate a duty of fidelity or loyalty,[62] while others include neither of these requirements.[63] And in some states “the bribe must transpire without the employer’s knowledge and consent,”[64] while in others it need not.[65]

The applicability of commercial bribery statutes to federal corruption is thus highly dependent on the specific statute and related case law. At a minimum, commercial bribery statutes can likely reach situations where federal officials bribe employees of private businesses, with more coverage potentially available in states that apply their commercial bribery statutes to public employees.

D. Statutes that apply to anyone: extortion, coercion, and threats

Finally, states have a variety of statutes that criminalize extortion, coercion, and threats. Generally, extortion involves using intimidation, threats, or force to obtain property or other things of value from someone.[66] Coercion, meanwhile, involves using similar means to compel someone to do something or restrict someone’s freedom of action.[67] By their terms, these laws cover private actors, state and local officials, federal officials, or anyone else. They could therefore potentially apply if federal officials improperly threaten private individuals or public officials to extract payments or induce other actions.

State statutes criminalizing extortion and/or coercion list a range of threats that can trigger criminality.[68] For example, California’s extortion statute covers threats:

1. To do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened or of a third person.
2. To accuse the individual threatened, or a relative of his or her, or a member of his or her family, of a crime.
3. To expose, or to impute to him, her, or them a deformity, disgrace, or crime.
4. To expose a secret affecting him, her, or them.
5. To report his, her, or their immigration status or suspected immigration status.[69]

Some states also have catchall categories covering a wider range of threats.[70] In the political realm, these statutes have been used, for example, to prosecute a New Jersey politician for threatening to release a sex tape of a city council member unless he resigned[71] and to prosecute Democratic Party officials in Kings County, New York, for threatening the withdrawal of party support from two judicial candidates if they did not make certain payments (where the payments did not clearly benefit the party or candidates).[72]

States typically do not require the threat to be successful in coercing or extorting the individual—the threat alone is typically (though not always) sufficient for culpability.[73] Additionally, the threatened actions need not always be independently unlawful—in many extortion cases, “the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money.”^[74] For example, threatening to terminate an employee’s at-will employment if they do not make a political contribution can constitute extortion.^[75] So too can threatening to file a complaint against a judge unless the judge takes a certain course of action.^[76]

The person making the threat has an affirmative defense, however, if “the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true, or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances”—for example, threatening to report a driver for speeding if they refuse to slow down would not constitute coercion.^[77] Similarly, threatening to file a civil lawsuit unless a settlement is paid is generally not extortion,^[78] although threats of completely baseless “sham litigation” can potentially rise to the level of extortion.[79] Additionally, some state coercion statutes have been struck down or narrowly construed due to First Amendment free speech concerns.[80]

Some states also criminalize threats themselves, without any accompanying coercion or extortion element. But these statutes are typically limited to severe threats of physical injury, mass violence, or death and are narrowly written or construed to avoid First Amendment concerns.^[81]

In sum, state statutes can potentially reach a wide range of federal corruption, with the exact scope varying state to state. Colorado, Indiana, and Maine have relatively straightforward criminal laws that allow for prosecuting a wide range of corrupt federal acts (to the extent those acts fall within each state’s criminal jurisdiction). Other states’ laws currently apply to a narrower subset of corrupt federal acts, such as corrupt federal interactions with state or local officials or with private employees. Taken together, statutes currently on the books give states a range of potential options to hold federal officials accountable for corruption, and states have a variety of options if they wish to broaden existing laws to provide additional coverage.

II. Process and barriers in addressing federal corruption via state statutes

Although state anti-corruption statutes can potentially apply to a wide range of corrupt federal conduct, there are complicating factors. For one, federal officials may try to raise immunity defenses, although such defenses will often be unavailing when the allegations against the official involve corrupt behavior. The president, however, enjoys an added layer of immunity that would complicate any corruption-related prosecution. Second, defendants have sometimes challenged anti-corruption prosecutions based on the Due Process Clause’s fair warning requirements. Novel applications of state anti-corruption statutes that were not reasonably foreseeable ahead of time could run into due process hurdles. Third, there are jurisdictional limits on what conduct states can address via criminal prosecutions—the conduct typically must relate to the state in some way, though the specific bounds of criminal jurisdiction are murky and contested. Lastly, it bears noting that federal officials can sometimes remove state prosecutions to federal court, but the limits of state criminal law would still apply in federal court.

A. Immunity of federal officials

First, federal officials may try to claim immunity from state prosecutions, but these claims are unlikely to succeed if the official is engaged in corruption. As explained in more depth in another explainer,[82] federal officials do not enjoy blanket immunity from state criminal prosecutions.[83] They are generally subject to the same criminal laws as other members of the public. However, federal officials can sometimes claim Supremacy Clause immunity, and the president enjoys an added layer of immunity protection for official acts.

Supremacy Clause immunity shields federal officials from state criminal prosecutions where the federal official’s actions—though potentially amounting to a state-law crime—were (1) authorized by federal law and (2) “necessary and proper” in fulfilling their federal duties.[84] For example, Supremacy Clause immunity has shielded federal wildlife officers from trespass charges when they accidentally entered private land while collaring wolves,[85] and it has shielded a U.S. Marshal from murder charges for shooting and killing an attacker while protecting a U.S. Supreme Court justice.[86] But this immunity is unlikely to extend to many corrupt actions. Many forms of corruption violate not only state criminal statutes, but federal law as well, thus precluding the defendant from showing federal authorization. And even where federal law does not prohibit the conduct at issue, the defendant may not have a credible argument that the conduct was a “necessary and proper” part of carrying out lawful federal duties. But if a state were to prosecute a federal official for acts reasonably undertaken pursuant to the official’s lawful federal duties, the official likely would have a valid Supremacy Clause immunity defense. To take a relatively clearcut example, a state almost certainly could not prosecute a federal agent who offers a bribe as part of a legally authorized federal sting operation.[87] In standard corruption cases, however, federal officials will likely have difficulty obtaining Supremacy Clause immunity.[88]

The president has immunity beyond that available to other federal actors, and thus any attempt to prosecute a president for corrupt acts would face additional challenges. In 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Trump v. United States that presidents, due to their unique constitutional status, are immune from prosecution (presumably at both the federal and state levels) for acts within their core constitutional powers, and they are at least presumptively immune with respect to other official acts.[89] The exact contours of this immunity have not yet been developed. The Court held in that case that President Donald Trump could not be federally prosecuted for his interactions with the DOJ in the aftermath of the 2020 election. The Court left it to the district court to decide whether he was also immune from prosecution for other actions he took surrounding the election. The district court never ruled on immunity, however, as the prosecutor dismissed the case after Trump was reelected in 2024.[90] It is therefore uncertain precisely how an immunity defense would fare if a president were prosecuted for corrupt acts. In a concurring opinion in Trump v. United States, Justice Barrett indicated that a president would not be immune from a bribery prosecution: “The Constitution, of course, does not authorize a President to seek or accept bribes, so the Government may prosecute him if he does so.”[91] But there would be questions in such a case about whether and how prosecutors could introduce evidence that the president performed an official act in exchange for an improper benefit.[92]

B. Fair warning and due process

In addition to immunity, federal actors could raise due process objections if prosecutors pursue charges based on creative interpretations of state anti-corruption statutes. The Due Process Clause requires “fair warning … of what the law intends.”[93] The key “touchstone” for the fair warning requirement “is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.”[94]

Courts handle this requirement in several ways. They may invalidate nebulous statutes under the vagueness or overbreadth doctrines or may construe ambiguous statutes narrowly under the rule of lenity.[95] Additionally, the fair warning requirement “bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.”[96]

State anti-corruption statutes have frequently survived due process challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth.[97] And many state anti-corruption statutes clearly reach (or could be amended to reach) a wide range of possible corrupt federal conduct, so prosecutions involving such plainly covered conduct should not raise due process issues. But to the extent state actors stretch the bounds of state statutes to address federal corruption in a way that is not fairly disclosed ahead of time, they could run into due process hurdles.

C. State criminal jurisdiction

Significantly, any state prosecution of federal corruption will need to fall within the reach of the state’s criminal jurisdiction. State statutes typically outline the reach of state criminal jurisdiction.[98] But an additional limit stems from the longstanding principle in domestic U.S. criminal law that “the authority to try and punish someone for a crime arises from the crime’s connection to territory.”[99] This “territoriality principle” traditionally binds criminal law to states’ borders—if you commit a crime in Maine, for instance, it “will be policed, prosecuted, and punished in Maine.”[100] Conversely, if you commit a crime in New York, New York courts generally cannot choose to apply Maine’s criminal laws to your case instead.[101] This principle “is so entrenched in domestic criminal law as to feel unremarkable” and stems from a mix of statutory law, common law, constitutional law, and institutional design.[102]

While this basic idea seems relatively straightforward, the reality is much more complex and, in practice, “domestic criminal law is less territorial than conventional wisdom holds.”[103] For one, some territorial theories of jurisdiction involve only loose connections to the state’s geography. For example, states often criminalize out-of-state conduct that has an in-state effect, such as harming a resident or perpetrating fraud without ever setting foot in the state.[104] Continuing offenses like fraud and inchoate offenses like conspiracy or attempt, meanwhile, involve a flexible approach to territoriality. In such cases, the relevant acts often cross state lines, and the question of territoriality becomes “a legal fiction based on artificial extensions of time and concepts like constructive presence.”[105] Furthermore, some cases have abandoned any clear territoriality hook, instead basing a state’s criminal jurisdiction on the individual’s citizenship (rather than presence) in the state or on “a state’s general interests in some industry or value.”[106]

The specifics of how far a state can extend its criminal jurisdiction remain murky, as debates over the extraterritorial application of state abortion bans have highlighted.[107] States can potentially extend their own criminal jurisdiction statutes to encompass out-of-state conduct, but the U.S. Constitution likely sets some limits on how far states can go. At a minimum, states must likely point to at least some connection to the state in order to allow for a criminal prosecution. The application of a specific state’s anti-corruption laws to federal corruption would likely therefore depend on the details of where the relevant acts took place, where the effects fell, the perpetrator’s state of citizenship, and/or whether the state has some other relevant interest.

D. Removal to federal court

Lastly, it is worth noting that state prosecutions may play out in federal rather than state court, though state criminal law would still apply. A federal statute allows federal defendants to move state cases to federal court if the case relates to the official’s employment[108] and the officer has a “colorable federal defense”[109]—i.e., a plausible defense based in federal law. This defense could be a due process claim or one of the immunities discussed above, all of which are rooted in the U.S. Constitution. The defense need not ultimately succeed in order to get the case into federal court, but it does need to be plausible or reasonable.[110] Given that corruption will typically be antithetical to the official’s federal duties, it is not apparent that a Supremacy Clause immunity claim would qualify as plausible, but this would likely be contested. If a case is removed to federal court, the state’s criminal laws would still apply; the case would simply proceed in federal court. Additionally, the president can only pardon federal crimes, not state crimes, even if the state criminal case proceeds in federal court.[111] For more discussion of removal to federal court, see the related explainer on state prosecution of federal officials.[112]

III. Alternative options for states to address federal corruption

Beyond criminal laws, states have a variety of additional tools they could potentially use to address federal-level corruption. This part provides a brief overview of some of these alternative avenues, including disclosure requirements, unfair competition laws, state ethics agencies, and other possibilities.

First, states already have various disclosure rules that apply to state government officials and to those who interact with state government.[113] States could potentially utilize existing disclosure rules or expand transparency requirements to shed light on corrupt interactions. For example, some states have worked to address “pay-to-play” corruption by requiring companies that contract with the state government to submit disclosures about their political contributions and affiliations.[114] Most pay-to-play statutes also restrict government contractors’ political contributions to state and local officials.[115] While typically used to address and prevent in-state corruption, these disclosure regimes and contracting requirements could potentially be extended to federal-level transactions as well. Where states are acting as market participants, such as by contracting for goods, they often have more leeway to require contractors to comply with various requirements that might otherwise be preempted.[116] States could potentially also utilize their contracting powers as a market participant or their investment powers in managing pension funds to favor companies that comply with certain ethical standards in their dealings with federal actors.[117]

Second, states’ unfair competition laws may offer an avenue for private or public litigants to bring claims addressing federal corruption involving businesses. Many states have consumer protection laws that can be enforced by government actors (such as the state attorney general), as well as through private causes of action for damages and/or other remedies (typically brought by aggrieved consumers or competitors).[118] The substantive scope of these laws is sometimes quite broad.[119] For example, California’s unfair competition law covers “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”[120] An “unlawful” business practice under California law can be based on violation of “[v]irtually any state, federal or local law,”[121] such as federal anti-corruption laws,[122] while an “unfair” practice is more open-ended and can reach “wrongful business conduct” not explicitly proscribed.[123] Washington’s unfair competition law meanwhile prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”[124] Plaintiffs can establish an “unfair” practice “in a number of ways,” such as offending public policy, causing substantial injury to consumers or competitors, being “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous,” and more.[125] Where corporations engage in corrupt acts with federal actors, such as paying for more favorable treatment than competitors or bribing federal officials to allow for monopoly-creating mergers, public and private litigants may be able to utilize these state laws to seek damages, restitution, injunctions, or other relief.

Third, the vast majority of states have one or more ethics commissions that enforce ethics rules in state government.[126] These bodies typically oversee state government officials’ compliance with rules related to gifts, campaign finance, and conflicts of interest.[127] Most of these commissions can initiate and conduct investigations, hold public hearings, issue subpoenas, and sanction state officials who violate ethics rules.[128] Where federal actors engage in corrupt interactions with state officials, as in the examples discussed in I.B, these state-level ethics enforcement mechanisms can shed light on the corrupt transaction and penalize the state actor.

This discussion of avenues for addressing corruption outside of the criminal realm is non-exhaustive. State legislatures may be able to utilize their investigatory powers to shed light on corrupt practices. Shareholders may be able to address corporate corruption via securities fraud class actions if the corporation fails to disclose corrupt acts or via derivative shareholder suits against the company’s managers, such as alleging that officers breached their fiduciary duties by exposing the company to liability under state or federal anti-corruption laws.[129] Or states could potentially enact laws that seek to give effect to the U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses, which bar the president and other federal officials from accepting emoluments (i.e., compensation or advantages) from foreign governments and also bar the president from receiving emoluments from state governments or the federal government (aside from a fixed salary).[130] Some have urged Congress to pass legislation adding teeth to these constitutional rules,[131] and states could potentially pursue similar mechanisms. The bottom line is states have many tools beyond criminal anti-corruption laws that could allow them to address federal corruption.

Conclusion

To the extent the federal government pulls back from combatting corruption, the task of addressing such misconduct may increasingly fall to the states. States have a wide array of anti-corruption statutes, and many of these statutes already apply to certain forms of federal corruption. States can also bolster their existing statutes by expressly including federal officials under definitions of public official corruption or by expanding the range of corrupt conduct covered. If federal actors are indeed acting corruptly, it may be difficult for them to claim immunity from state criminal prosecutions. And beyond criminal prohibitions, there are other potential state-level options for checking federal-level corruption. States therefore may become a more central site for holding federal officials accountable.

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Endnotes

[1] Alanna Durkin Richer, Ex-Mayor, Elected at Age 23, Loses Corruption Case Appeal, Associated Press (Nov. 29, 2022, 09:40 CT), https://apnews.com/article/business-boston-marijuana-massachusetts-fall-river-7b543f766330a6b0367fccf1f3c68ba2.

[2] Jack Queen & Luc Cohen, Former Congressman Santos Pleads Guilty, Faces at Least 2 Years In Prison, Reuters (Aug. 20, 2024, 03:44 CT), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/expelled-former-rep-santos-plead-guilty-corruption-charges-source-says-2024-08-19/; Larry Neumeister & Michael R. Sisak, Former US Sen. Bob Menendez Gets 11 Years in Prison for Taking Bribes and Acting as Agent of Egypt, Associated Press (Jan. 29, 2025, 19:06 PM CT), https://apnews.com/article/bob-menendez-sentencing-new-jersey-bribery-fc8720f8b74fd431b40b1f7b4dcd5ac7.

[3] Gardiner Harris, Ex-Head of F.D.A. Faces Criminal Inquiry, N.Y. Times (Apr. 29, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/29/washington/exhead-of-fda-faces-criminal-inquiry.html; Rebecca Leung, Cashing in for Profit?, CBS News (Jan. 4, 2005, 10:56 ET), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cashing-in-for-profit/.

[4] Jose Pagliery, The Justice Department Had 36 Lawyers Fighting Corruption Full-Time. Under Trump, It’s Down to Two., NOTUS (Sept. 22, 2025, 05:30 CT), https://www.notus.org/courts/doj-public-integrity; Alanna Durkin Richer & Eric Tucker, Justice Department Is Expected to Slash Public Corruption Unit, AP Sources Say, Associated Press (Mar. 11, 2025, 21:51 CT), https://apnews.com/article/justice-department-public-corruption-unit-cuts-4123347b1ffe4a0f3c681e49a15ab4ca.

[5] Ryan J. Reilly, FBI Fires Special Agents Who Worked on Jack Smith’s Probe Into Trump, NBC News (Oct. 8, 2025, 16:06 CT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/fbi-fires-special-agents-worked-jack-smiths-probe-trump-rcna236415.

[6] Charlie Savage, Trump’s Plan to Take Jet from Qatar Heightens Corruption Concerns, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/trump-qatar-jet-plane.html.

[7] Devlin Barrett, Glenn Thrush, Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, & Hamed Aleaziz, Trump Justice Dept. Closed Investigation into Tom Homan for Accepting Bag of Cash, N.Y. Times (Sept. 20, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/20/us/politics/tom-homan-fbi-trump.html.

[8] Justin Elliott, Joshua Kaplan & Alex Mierjeski, Firm Tied to Kristi Noem Secretly Got Money from $220 Million DHS Ad Contracts, ProPublica (Nov. 14, 2025, 05:00 CT), https://www.propublica.org/article/kristi-noem-dhs-ad-campaign-strategy-group.

[9] See, e.g., Trump’s Corrupt Transactions, Campaign Legal Center (Oct. 15, 2025), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/CLC_Trump_Transaction_Tracker_0.pdf; Rebecca Jacobs,  Trump’s Term 2 Corruption by the Numbers: More Golf Trips, More Foreign Visitors and More Profits, CREW (July 21, 2025), https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-reports/trumps-term-2-corruption-by-the-numbers-more-golf-trips-more-foreign-visitors-and-more-profits/; Tracking Trump’s Visits to His Properties and Other Conflicts of Interest, CREW (Apr. 10, 2025), https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-reports/tracking-trumps-visits-to-his-properties-and-other-conflicts-of-interest/; 100 Days of Corruption: Oversight Democrats Highlight 100 Conflicts of Interest as President Trump Clears the Path for Corruption, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform (Apr. 30, 2025), https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/100-days-corruption-oversight-democrats-highlight-100-conflicts-interest; Editorial Board, A Comprehensive Accounting of Trump’s Culture of Corruption, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/07/opinion/trump-corruption.html; Eric Lipton & David Yaffe-Bellany, Auction to Dine with Trump Creates Foreign Influence Opportunity, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-crypto-coin-auction.html; Eric Lipton, Michael Rothfeld, David Yaffe-Bellany & Ana Swanson, Family Affair: Commerce Secretary’s Sons Cash In on A.I. Frenzy, N.Y. Times (Nov. 20, 2025),  https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/20/us/politics/howard-lutnick-family-ai.html (finding that “business has boomed” at the Commerce Secretary’s sons’ businesses while the secretary has “promoted data center construction”); Letter from David Min, et al. to Brad Karp Re: Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP Agreement with the Trump Administration (Apr. 24, 2025), available at https://min.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/min.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/04.24.25-letters-to-law-firms-on-trump-administration-agreements-all.pdf (questioning whether law firms’ agreements with the Trump Administration violate state and federal anti-corruption laws).

[10] See Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. 391, 399 (2020) (“The upshot is that federal fraud law leaves much public corruption to the States (or their electorates) to rectify.”).

[11] Bryna Godar, Explainer: Can States Prosecute Federal Officials?, State Democracy Rsch. Initiative (July 17, 2025), https://statedemocracy.law.wisc.edu/featured/2025/explainer-can-states-prosecute-federal-officials/.

[12] As explained in Part II, the analysis would differ if a state were to try to prosecute the president. In Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024), the Court held that presidents are immune from prosecution for acts within their core constitutional powers and presumptively immune from prosecution with respect to other official acts.

[13] See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 13A-10-1(2), (7) (defining “[p]ublic servant” as “[a]ny officer or employee of government” and “[g]overnment” as “[t]he state, county, municipality, or other political subdivision thereof …”); Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(57)(A) (“‘public servant’ means … an officer or employee of the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or a governmental instrumentality of the state …”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-146(3)–(4) (“‘Public servant’ is an officer or employee of government … [;] ‘Government’ includes any branch, subdivision or agency of the state or any locality within it.”).

[14] See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901 (“(i) ‘Government’ includes the United States, any state, county, municipality, or other political unit, any branch, department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing, and any corporation or other entity established by law to carry out any governmental function. … (o) ‘Public servant’ means any officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses.” (emphasis added)); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A §§ 2(13), (21) (nearly identical); Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-261 (“‘Public servant’ means a person who: (1) is authorized to perform an official function on behalf of, and is paid by, a governmental entity …”); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-31.5-2-144(a) (“‘Governmental entity’ means: (1) the United States or any state, county, township, city, town, separate municipal corporation, special taxing district, or public school corporation …”).

[15] See Neil v. City of Lone Tree, No. 1:23-CV-01155-RMR-SBP, 2024 WL 4204142, at *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-01155-RMR-SBP, 2024 WL 4252820 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2024) (state prosecutors concluded that a United States Drug Enforcement Administration officer “is a public servant” under Colorado statutes and charged him with official misconduct but later dropped the charges based on the misconduct question, not the public servant definition).

[16] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-404 (first degree); id. § 18-8-405 (second degree); Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 608.

[17] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-402; Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-1(3); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 609.

[18] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-302; Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-2; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 602.

[19] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-303 (compensation for past official behavior); id. § 18-8-304 (soliciting unlawful compensation); Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-2 (gratuities); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 604 (improper compensation for past action); id. § 605 (improper gifts to public servants); id. § 606 (improper compensation for services).

[20] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-306 (attempt to influence a public servant); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 603 (improper influence).

[21] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-404. See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-405 (“(1) A public servant commits second degree official misconduct if he knowingly, arbitrarily, and capriciously: (a) Refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law; or (b) Violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his office. (2) Second degree official misconduct is a petty offense.”); Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-1 (“A public servant who knowingly or intentionally: (1) commits an offense in the performance of the public servant’s official duties; (2) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from an appointee or employee any property other than what the public servant is authorized by law to accept as a condition of continued employment; (3) acquires or divests himself or herself of a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise or aids another person to do so based on information obtained by virtue of the public servant’s office that official action that has not been made public is contemplated; or (4) fails to deliver public records and property in the public servant’s custody to the public servant’s successor in office when that successor qualifies; commits official misconduct, a Level 6 felony.”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 608 (“1. A person is guilty of official oppression if, being a public servant and acting with the intention to benefit himself or another or to harm another, he knowingly commits an unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office. 2. Official oppression is a Class E crime.”).

[22] Ben Covington, Comment, State Official Misconduct Statutes and Anticorruption Federalism After Kelly v. United States, 121 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 273, 275–76 (2021) (discussing examples); see also id. at 288–92 (discussing drawbacks of extensive discretion under broad official misconduct statutes).

[23] See, e.g., In re Weissmann, 105 N.Y.S.3d 124, 125 (App. Div. 2019) (discussing official misconduct prosecution of local special prosecutor who submitted false documentation to benefit village trustee); People v. Larsen, 808 P.2d 1265, 1266 (Colo. 1991) (discussing official misconduct prosecution of district attorney who “did not turn in or otherwise prosecute” employee for drug use so the employee could supply the prosecutor and his wife with marijuana).

[24] Covington, supra note 22, at 276 (discussing Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. 391 (2020)).

[25] See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Trump, 25-CV-07864-RFL, 2025 WL 3187762 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction halting the Trump administration’s efforts to cut funding for the University of California system, concluding “that Defendants have engaged in coercive and retaliatory conduct in violation of the First Amendment and Tenth Amendment”).

[26] Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-1(3); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-402 (“(1) Any public servant, in contemplation of official action by himself or by a governmental unit with which he is associated or in reliance on information to which he has access in his official capacity and which has not been made public, commits misuse of official information if he: (a) Acquires a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise which may be affected by such information or official action; or (b) Speculates or wagers on the basis of such information or official action; or (c) Aids, advises, or encourages another to do any of the foregoing with intent to confer on any person a special pecuniary benefit. (2) Misuse of official information is a class 5 felony.”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 609 (“1. A person is guilty of misuse of information if, being a public servant and knowing that official action is contemplated, or acting in reliance on information which he has acquired by virtue of his office or from another public servant, he: A. Acquires or divests himself of a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction or enterprise that may be affected by such official action or information; B. Speculates or wagers on the basis of such official action or information; or C. Knowingly aids another to do any of the things described in paragraphs A and B. 2. Misuse of information is a Class E crime.”).

[27] See, e.g., Robert Faturechi & Brandon Roberts, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy Sold Stocks Two Days Before Trump Announced a Plan for Reciprocal Tariffs, ProPublica (May 19, 2025), https://www.propublica.org/article/sean-duffy-stock-sales-trump-tariffs?utm_campaign=propublica-sprout&utm_content=1747710003&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter (noting “it’s unclear whether Duffy had any information about the timing or scale of Trump’s reciprocal tariff plans before the public did”).

[28] See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-302(1)(b).

[29] See, e.g., id. § 18-8-302(1)(a).

[30] Id. § 18-8-302(1)(a). “‘Pecuniary benefit’ means benefit in the form of money, property, commercial interests, or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain.” Id. § 18-1-901(3)(m).

[31] Id. § 18-8-302(1)(b).

[32] See Eric Tucker, Trump Reaches Deals with 5 Law Firms, Allowing Them to Avoid Prospect of Punishing Executive Orders, Associated Press (Apr. 11, 2025, 19:55 CT), https://apnews.com/article/trump-law-firms-executive-order-fe8f38a61cf77c5bb6add1315f5f96f1; Rebecca Beitsch, Trump Announces $600 Million in New Deals with Five Law Firms, The Hill (Apr. 11, 2025, 13:21 ET), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5244876-trump-signs-deals-law-firms/.

[33] See, e.g., Min, supra note 9 (questioning whether law firms’ agreements with the Trump Administration violate state and federal anti-corruption laws).

[34] See Campaign Legal Center supra note 9.

[35] Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 605(1)(A). “‘Pecuniary benefit’ means any advantage in the form of money, property, commercial interest or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain.” Id. tit. 17-A § 602.2.C.

[36] Savage, supra note 6 (“Mr. Trump also signaled that he viewed Qatar’s offer of a plane as something of a quid pro quo, emphasizing that the United States had provided security to the Gulf country and ‘we will continue to.’”). As discussed further below, however, the president enjoys heightened immunity compared to other federal officials. See infra section II.A.

[37] See infra section II.C.

[38] See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-10-61; Alaska Stat. § 11.56.100; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2602; Cal. Penal Code §§ 67, 67.5, 85 (West 2025); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-147; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1201; Fla. Stat. § 838.015; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-2; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/33-1; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-201 (West 2025); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, § 2; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.117; Minn. Stat. § 609.42; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.010, 197.020; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27-2 (West 2025); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-24-1; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 200.00–200.04 (McKinney 2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-217; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-12-01; Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.015; 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-4; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1101; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.68.010; W. Va. Code § 61-5A-3; Wis. Stat. § 946.10; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102.

[39] See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1205; Fla. Stat. § 112.313(2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, §§ 3, 4; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 640:4–640:6; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27-11 (West 2025); N.Y. Penal Law § 200.20–22 (McKinney 2025) (rewarding official misconduct);id. § 200.30 (giving unlawful gratuities); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-12-03; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.68.020–9A.68.030; W. Va. Code §§ 61-5A-4, 61-5A-6; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-103.

[40] See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2603; Cal. Penal Code § 73 (West 2025); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 197.080; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 640:7; N.Y. Penal Law § 200.45 (McKinney 2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-228; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-12-04; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.68.040; W. Va. Code § 61-5A-7.

[41] See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2606; Cal. Penal Code § 71 (West 2025); Cal. Const. art. IV, § 15; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1207; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-708 (West 2025); Minn. Stat. § 609.425; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 198.010 (improperly influencing a member of a legislative body); id. § 199.300 (intimidating a public officer); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:27-3, 2C:27-5 (West 2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-16.7; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-12-06; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-12-06; Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.465; 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-4; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1702(f); W. Va. Code § 61-5A-5; Wis. Stat. § 946.17.

[42] Compare, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-147 (West) (bribery) with id. § 53a-148 (West) (bribe receiving).

[43] See N.Y. Penal Law § 200.04 (McKinney 2025) (first-degree bribery); id. § 200.03 (second-degree bribery); id. § 200.00 (third-degree bribery).

[44] Id. § 10.00.17.

[45] See People v. Moreno, 100 A.D.3d 435, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (prospect of sexual relations); People v. Connolly, 63 A.D.3d 1703, 1704 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (directing investigations of a candidate’s opponents and critics for purely political purposes); People v. Feerick, 714 N.E.2d 851, 856 (N.Y. 1999) (“It is clear both from the legislative history and from the statutory definition of ‘benefit’ that the official misconduct statute was designed to include gain other than graft or financial advantage.”). The benefit need not even be obtained for the public official’s own advantage; it can be obtained in favor of a third party, such as by dismissing charges against a friend’s son. People v. Flanagan, 71 N.E.3d 541, 549 n.8, 550 (N.Y. 2017).

[46] See Flanagan, 71 N.E.3d at 549 (dismissing criminal charges against a friend’s son qualified as a “benefit”).

[47] N.Y. Penal Law § 200.03 (McKinney 2025) (second-degree bribery).

[48] The judge who ordered dismissal at the government’s request wrote that “[e]verything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions.” Ryan Lucas & Carrie Johnson, Federal Judge Drops Corruption Case Against New York City Mayor Eric Adams, NPR (Apr. 2, 2025, 10:08 ET), https://www.npr.org/2025/04/02/g-s1-57386/judge-new-york-eric-adams.

[49] See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-444; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1205; id. tit. 11, § 1206; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 46-237; Mass. Gen. Laws 268A § 3; N.Y. Penal Law § 200.30 (McKinney 2025); id. § 200.35; W. Va. Code § 61-5A-6.

[50] See Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024) (“As a general matter, bribes are payments made or agreed to before an official act in order to influence the official with respect to that future official act. … Gratuities are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation.”).

[51] See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 18.3(e) (3d ed. 2025) (Criminal coercion).

[52] See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-708; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-16.7; 11 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-42-4.

[53] See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 21-8-607(b)(1); Me. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 603(2); Nev. Rev. Stat.

• 199.300(1)(d).

[54] See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.425.

[55] Jeffrey Boles, Examining the Lax Treatment of Commercial Bribery in the United States: A Prescription for Reform, 51 Am. Bus. L.J. 119, 132–33 (2014).

[56] See, e.g., United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 732–33 (5th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (discussing commercial bribery scheme where one defendant paid another for stolen data).

[57] See, e.g., 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-4(a) (“No person shall corruptly give or offer any gift or valuable consideration to any person in public or private employ …”); People v. Nankervis, 46 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Mich. 1951) (concluding that commercial bribery statute can apply to public city employee, not just private employees); United States v. Burke, No. 19 CR 322, 2024 WL 3090277, at *17 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2024) (noting that commercial bribery statute could apply to alderman as employee of Chicago).

[58] See United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D. Conn. 1990) (New York advertising agency bribing Jamaican officials to influence the Jamaica Tourist Board to hire the agency); People v. Tuttle, 356 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (1974) (discussing changes to statute that broadened its application).

[59] See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benoit, 347 Mass. 1, 196 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1964) (concluding prior version of the state’s commercial bribery statute (similar to its current version) applied only “to acts of agents, employees or servants of persons or corporations engaged in private business and not to acts of public officers”); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2605(A) (referring to an “employer’s commercial affairs,” which could similarly suggest a limitation to private-sector employees).

[60] See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00.17 (McKinney 2025); supra note 45 and accompanying text.

[61] See Boles, supra note 55, at 133–34; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2605(A)(1) (requiring that a benefit be given with the intent “that such benefit will influence the conduct of the employee in relation to the employer’s commercial affairs” and that “the conduct of the employee causes economic loss to the employer”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508(2)(a) (West 2025) (requiring the act to be “contrary to the interests of the employer or principal”).

[62] See, Boles, supra note 55, at 133; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-10 (West 2025); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-401(1). The Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that a “duty of fidelity” means a “duty of loyalty” as understood at common law. People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 496 (Colo. 1986).

[63] See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.125 (merely requiring intent or understanding that the employee will “act in a particular manner in relation to his or her principal’s or employer’s business”); People v. Nankervis, 46 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Mich. 1951) (holding that a similar prior version of Michigan’s statute “does not make injury to the employer a necessary element of the offense”); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-160; Boles, supra note 55, at 133–34.

[64] Boles, supra note 55, at 125. See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/29A-1; Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527, 1539 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (the president and owner of a company “is incapable of being bribed” under the Illinois statute); Walgreen Co. v. Peters, No. 21-CV-02522, 2025 WL 755706, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2025) (noting plaintiffs failed to allege that corrupt business scheme amounted to commercial bribery under the state statute because the principals were in on it too); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-160.

[65] See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 271, § 39; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.125; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-10 (West 2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-353; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-4; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.68.060; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 134.05. Some courts may still read in a secrecy requirement. See, e.g., N. J. Gendron Lumber Co. v. Great N. Homes, Inc., 395 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (noting that “secretiveness and intent to suborn … are essential elements of commercial bribery” even where statute did not specifically list secretiveness). Others have declined to do so in the absence of statutory language. See, e.g., In re EpiPen Direct Purchaser Litig., No. 20-CV-0827 (ECT/JFD), 2023 WL 2860858, at *7 (D. Minn. Apr. 10, 2023) (“establishing lack of knowledge and consent is not required under New Jersey’s amended commercial bribery statute”); State v. Brewer, 129 S.E.2d 262, 272–73, 283 (N.C. 1963) (distinguishing between statutes that include an explicit requirement that the bribery be “without the knowledge and consent of the principal, employer or master of such agent, employee or servant” and those that do not).

[66] See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 518–519; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-207; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 846; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-764; La. Stat. Ann. § 14:66; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 637:5; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-9; Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.075; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-2; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.56.110–.130; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1701.

[67] See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.530; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-208; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-192; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 791; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-707; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:13-5; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 135.60–.65; Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.070.

[68] See LaFave, supra note 51, § 18.3(e) (Criminal coercion, discussing range of threats that suffice); id. § 20.4(a) (Statutory extortion or blackmail, same).

[69] Cal. Penal Code § 519 (West 2025).

[70] LaFave, supra note 51, § 20.4(a) (Statutory extortion or blackmail, first quoting Model Penal Code § 223.4(7), then quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05 (McKinney 2025)).

[71] State v. Callaway, A-2739-09T3, 2012 WL 4448776, at *2–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 27, 2012); Robinson v. City of Atl. City, A-6052-10T4, 2013 WL 1352069, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 5, 2013).

[72] People v. Feldman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 361, 370–72, 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (concluding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendants were not “act[ing] for the benefit of the Party”).

[73] See LaFave, supra note 51, § 18.3(e) (Criminal coercion); id. § 20.4(a) (Statutory extortion or blackmail).

[74] Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 20 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Philippine Exp. & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian, 267 Cal. Rptr. 457, 467 (1990)); see also Feldman, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 376 (“a person may commit extortion or coercion by making a lawful demand for an unlawful reason”).

[75] Galeotti v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Loc. No. 3, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 387 (2020).

[76] Blandino v. State, 2023 WL 8827159, at *5 (Nev. Ct. App. 2023) (unpublished table decision).

[77] LaFave, supra note 51, § 18.3(e) (Criminal coercion) (quoting Model Penal Code § 212.5).

[78] See, e.g., State v. Rendelman, 947 A.2d 546, 554 (Md. 2008) (“[A] threat to file suit unless a settlement is paid, even when made in bad faith, is not a ‘wrongful’ threat within the meaning of the extortion statutes” (cleaned up)); State v. Cohen, 807 S.E.2d 861, 868 (Ga. 2017) (“a threat of litigation, by itself, is not unlawful”); Argote-Romero v. LAZ Parking LTD., LLC, 264 N.E.3d 859, 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025) (“The threat to file a lawsuit, even if that action would be utterly meritless, does not amount to extortion.”), appeal not allowed, 260 N.E.3d 426 (Ohio 2025).

[79] United States v. Koziol, 993 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e hold that threats of sham litigation, which are made to obtain property to which the defendant knows he has no lawful claim, are ‘wrongful’ under the Hobbs Act.”). But see United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases concluding that even bad-faith threats to file lawsuits do not constitute “wrongful” conduct and dismissing prosecution even where threat was allegedly “made in bad faith and supported by false affidavits”).

[80] See LaFave, supra note 51, § 18.3(e) (Criminal coercion); In re Manuel G., 941 P.2d 880, 814–15 (Cal. 1997) (“To avoid the risk of punishing protected First Amendment speech, however, the term ‘threat’ has been limited to mean a threat of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter the officer.”); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 589–90 (Or. 1982) (“[W]e cannot escape the conclusion that ORS 163.275 as written reaches areas of constitutionally privileged expression and thus is invalid unless its coverage is narrowed to exclude these areas.”); Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1081 (1983).

[81] See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.1; id. § 14-277.6; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1702.

[82] Godar, supra note 11.

[83] See Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 518 (1932) (“Federal officers and employees are not, merely because they are such, granted immunity from prosecution in state courts for crimes against state law.”); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56 (1920) (“[A]n employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment.”).

[84] In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2240 (2003).

[85] Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1213, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2006).

[86] In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 3.

[87] Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 1982).

[88] It is also unlikely that intergovernmental immunity, which is also rooted in the Supremacy Clause would apply. For discussion of intergovernmental immunity, see Harrison Stark, Explainer: State-Created Damages Remedies Against Federal Officials, State Democracy Rsch. Initiative (Aug. 1, 2025), https://statedemocracy.law.wisc.edu/featured/2025/explainer-state-created-damages-remedies-against-federal-officials/.

[89] Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).

[90] Ryan J. Reilly & Ken Dilanian, Judge Agrees to Dismiss Donald Trump’s 2020 Election Interference Case, NBC News (Nov. 25, 2024, 12:16 CT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/jack-smith-files-drop-jan-6-charges-donald-trump-rcna181667.

[91] Trump, 604 U.S. at 652 (Barrett, J., concurring).

[92] See id. at 652 n.3 (majority opinion) (explaining that, in a bribery prosecution, the prosecutor could “point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act” but could not “admit testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself”).

[93] United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 259 (1997) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).

[94] Id. at 267.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] See, e.g., United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2017) (New Jersey’s bribery statute not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding Utah commercial bribery statute was not unconstitutionally vague, overturning district court’s contrary holding), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 359 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding Colorado’s commercial bribery statute and noting that “[s]imilar commercial bribery statutes have been uniformly upheld in the face of vagueness challenges”); United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (Louisiana commercial bribery statute not void for vagueness); State v. Davis, 124 A.3d 966, 973 (Conn. Ct. App. 2015) (Connecticut witness bribery statute not unconstitutionally vague); Czajkowski v. State, 178 So. 3d 498, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (unlawful compensation for official behavior statute not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Bryant, 819 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (phrase “otherwise engaged to serve in a public capacity” in bribery statute not unconstitutionally vague); Stanton v. State, 130 P.3d 486, 493–94 (Wyo. 2006) (Wyoming bribery statutes not unconstitutionally vague); Bachlet v. State, 941 P.2d 200, 204–06 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (Alaska statute criminalizing public servant’s receipt of bribe not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); State v. Agan, 384 S.E.2d 863, 866–67 (Ga. 1989) (Georgia bribery statute not unconstitutionally vague); State v. O’Neill, 700 P.2d 711, 715 (Wash. 1985) (Washington bribery statute not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); Ex Parte Mattox, 683 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. App. 1984) (Texas commercial bribery statute not void for vagueness); Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 127–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (general Texas bribery statute not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad); see also United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1192 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rule of lenity argument regarding federal bribery statute, noting that “[a]pplication of the rule requires a ‘grievous ambiguity’” (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998))). But see Roque v. State, 664 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1995) (voiding prior Florida commercial bribery statute as unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary).

[98] See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Pro. L. § 20.20 (“Geographical jurisdiction of offenses; jurisdiction of state.”).

[99] Emma Kaufman, Territoriality in American Criminal Law, 121 Mich. L. Rev. 353, 355 (2022).

[100] Id. at 360; see also Model Penal Code § 1.03 note (A.L.I., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“[I]t has long been a maxim of American jurisprudence that a state will not enforce the penal laws of another state.”).

[101] Kaufman, supra note 99, at 363.

[102] Id. at 360–75.

[103] Id. at 356.

[104] Id. at 378; see also Model Penal Code § 1.03; Darryl K. Brown, Extraterritorial State Criminal Law, Post-Dobbs, 113 J. Crim. L. Criminology 853, 866–67 (2024).

[105] Kaufman, supra note 99, at 377.

[106] Id. at 379–80; see also Brown, supra note 104, at 869–71.

[107] Roderick M. Hills Jr., Choice of Law in an Era of Abortion Conflict, State Court Report (Feb. 03, 2025, updated Apr. 3, 2025), https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/choice-law-era-abortion-conflict (“the doctrine is deeply uncertain”); see also Brown, supra note 104; Paul Schiff Berman, Roey Goldstein & Sophie Leff, Conflicts of Law and the Abortion War Between the States, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 399–400 (2024); Lea Brilmayer, Abortion, Full Faith and Credit, and the “Judicial Power” Under Article III, 44 Colum. J. Gender & L. 441, 443–446 (2024); C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If Roe Is Overruled—Extraterritorial Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 87, 96 (1993); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 873, 875–877 (1993).

[108] 28 U.S.C. § 1442.

[109] Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989); see also David N. Goldman, The Neglected History of State Prosecutions for State Crimes in Federal Courts, 52 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 783, 784 (2020) (discussing the Article III implications of the removal statute).

[110] Cf. New York v. De Vecchio, 468 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting removal where defendant did not sufficiently explain his immunity defense); New York v. Trump, 683 F. Supp. 3d 334, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), appeal dismissed sub nom., People v. Trump, No. 23-1085, 2023 WL 9380793 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2023) (rejecting removal effort after concluding immunity claim was “not a colorable defense”).

[111] See Bryna Godar, Are Federal Officials Immune From State Prosecution?, Lawfare (Nov. 6, 2025, 8:00), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/are-federal-officials-immune-from-state-prosecution; Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, John Connolly, & David Reiser, State Prosecutions of Federal Agents and the Presidential Pardon Power, Lawfare (Nov. 6, 2025, 8:00), www.lawfaremedia.org/article/state-prosecutions-of-federal-agents-and-the-presidential-pardon-power.

[112] Godar, supra note 11.

[113] Coal. for Integrity, States With Anti-Corruption Measures for Public Officials Index Report 2020, https://www.c4integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-SWAMP-Index-Final-Report-2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2025); Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, State Campaign Finance Disclosure Requirements Toolkit (July 30, 2023), https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/state-campaign-finance-disclosure-requirements-toolkit; Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Independent Expenditure Disclosure Requirements, (July 22, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/independent-expenditure-disclosure-requirements.

[114] See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 14-104(c) (requires state contractors to report state and local political contributions above $500); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-27-2 (requiring contractors to disclose state and local political contributions above $250).

[115] Allison C. Davis, Presupposing Corruption: Access, Influence, and the Future of the Pay-to-Play Legal Framework, 7 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 197, 215 (2016); Monica Njeri Mugure, Plugging Loopholes in State Pay-to-Play Statutes: Creating an Effective Anti-Corruption Law, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 179, 185 (Fall 2014).

[116] See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993) (when a state “interact[s] with private participants in the marketplace[,] … [it] is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to state regulation” (emphasis in original)); Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a city’s towing contract specifications “were designed only to procure services that the City itself needed, not to regulate the conduct of others” and therefore were not preempted by federal motor carrier laws); Michael Burger, “It’s Not Easy Being Green”: Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 835, 851–57 (2010) (discussing the market participant exception and preemption in the context of climate policy).

[117] See Jill Fisch & Jeff Schwartz, The Singular Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 104 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 5–7), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5243139; Andreas G. F. Hoepner & Lisa Schopohl, State Pension Funds and Corporate Social Responsibility: Do Beneficiaries’ Political Values Influence Funds’ Investment Decisions?, 165 J. Bus. Ethics 489, 490-91 (2020).

[118] Samuel Evan Milner, From Rancid to Reasonable: Unfair Methods of Competition Under State Little FTC Acts, 73 Am. U. L. Rev. 857, 881 (2024) (“[E]very state [with a Little FTC Act] allows for some form of investigation and enforcement by public authorities.”); id. at 882 (“[E]very state law grants some private right of action to sue for violations of the act alongside state officials.”).

[119] Id. at 860 (“[M]any of these laws expressly prohibit unfair methods of competition in addition to their more commonly discussed prohibitions on harming consumers through unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”); see also Justia, Consumer Protection Laws: 50-State Survey (Oct. 2023), https://www.justia.com/consumer/ consumer-protection-laws-50-state-survey/.

[120] Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

[121] People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 4th 508, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 16, 2003); see also Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (“Section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.”).

[122] See Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 943 (discussing unfair competition case based on violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, “which prohibits, among other things, bribing a foreign government official for the purpose of influencing any act or decision in his or her official capacity and in violation of a lawful duty, or for the purpose of inducing the use of official influence to obtain or retain business”).

[123] Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 496 P.2d 817, 829 (Cal. 1972)).

[124] Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.020.

[125] Greenberg v. Amazon.com, Inc., 553 P.3d 626, 639–41 (Wash. 2024), as amended (Aug. 16, 2024) (concluding that three criteria articulated in prior federal case law can demonstrate an unfair practice and that those criteria are not exhaustive—“there may even be additional ways that a plaintiff can show that act or practice that is unregulated by statute is unfair”).

[126] Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, State Ethics Commissions, (Dec. 16, 2024), https://www.ncsl.org/ethics/state-ethics-commissions.

[127] See Coal. For Integrity, supra note 113, at 13–14, 17–24.

[128] Id. at 16, 25.

[129] See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 1217 (2012) (discussing shareholder suits based on corporate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations while noting the hurdles to such cases); Kevin E. Davis & Mariana Pargendler, Controlling Shareholders and Control Enhancing Mechanisms, 25 Theoretical Inquiries L. 107, 130 (2024).

[130] U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.

[131] Eric E. Petry, Daniel I. Weiner, & Harry Isaiah Black, Codifying the Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Nov. 6, 2025), https://www.brennancenter.org/media/14688/download/2025_codifying_emoluments_clauses.pdf?inline=1https://www.brennancenter.org/media/14688/download/2025_codifying_emoluments_clauses.pdf?inline=1.